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Using a sample of 51 banking organizations, I examine the effect of the Statement 
of Financial Accounting Standard 133 on the belief heterogeneity of market participants 
and how this heterogeneity affects abnormal trading volume surrounding earnings 
announcements. SFAS 133 is the first standard to require that all derivatives be recognized 
at fair-value and that the fluctuations in derivative fair-values be reported in either net 
income or other comprehensive income. The behavior of derivative instruments and the 
fair-valuation and treatment prescribed by SFAS 133 are complex. Due to the underlying 
complexity of both derivatives and the accounting treatment prescribed by the SFAS 133 
standard, I expect that investors may have differing interpretations of the newly provided 
information. My hypothesis is that the income effects arising from the fair-value 
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accounting for derivatives (SFAS 133) are associated with an increase in differing beliefs 
among individuals.    
 I find that the income effects of SFAS 133 are significantly and positively related 
to belief heterogeneity among investors. The net income and other comprehensive income 
effects of SFAS 133 are significantly and positively related to increasing levels of 
abnormal trading volume surrounding earnings announcements. Additionally, levels of 
SFAS 133 net income is positively and significantly associated with three measures of 
belief heterogeneity derived from analysts’ forecasts. In an extended analysis I model the 
SFAS 133 income effects on abnormal volume using the three belief heterogeneity 
measures as the conduit. I find support for two of the three heterogeneity measures acting 
as a conduit for the effect of the SFAS 133 related income measures on abnormal volume. 
 The results of this study indicate that, while the recognized fair-value of derivatives 
is value relevant to equity prices (Ahmed, Kilic, & Lobo, 2006), the income effects of the 
same financial standard causes heterogeneity in beliefs about the firm. This suggests that, 
at least in the case of derivative fair-values, there exists a trade-off between value 
relevance and the strength of consensus surrounding beliefs in the market.  
  
 
  
 
 
  1
I Introduction 
 
The promulgation of Statement of Financial Accounting Standard (SFAS) 133 
represents another significant step in the movement toward fair-value accounting. SFAS 
133 requires that all derivatives be recognized (versus disclosed) at fair-value and that the 
fluctuations in fair-value be reported in either net income or other comprehensive income. 
Recent literature (for example, Ahmed, Kilic, & Lobo (2006)) provides evidence that the 
fair-value recognitions required under SFAS 133 are value-relevant. Value relevance is 
inferred from the aggregate market response operationalized as equity price reactions 
surrounding SFAS 133 recognitions. Prior studies suggest that trading volume can provide 
insights into the effects of information on market participants not available though an 
examination of consensus valuation (price) alone (Karpoff, 1987). Price responses reflect 
the aggregate market valuation whereas trading volume reflects differing beliefs, and 
possible information asymmetry among individuals. This study seeks to evaluate the 
possible asymmetry effect of the new standard by examining the belief heterogeneity 
among investors.  
 Using a sample of 51 banking organizations, I examine the heterogeneity in market 
participant responses to the fair-value recognitions required under SFAS 133. Under 
conditions where information is commonly received, assessments of the firm value can 
vary among individual market participants when they possess differential expertise in 
processing the information and/or they apply different underlying assumptions in their 
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interpretation of the information.1 While market forces will impound the consensus 
(average) interpretation of available information into the market value of the firm, SFAS 
133 recognitions may expand the range of differential valuations held by individuals 
around the consensus price.2 To the extent that the new information resulting from SFAS 
133 generates greater differential (heterogeneous) beliefs among market participants, the 
standard may be inducing asymmetry among individuals.  
 The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) has issued several standards 
dealing with the valuation, disclosure, and recognition of derivative fair-values. Disclosure 
of derivative information was first broadly addressed in 1990 with SFAS 105.3 SFAS 107 
and SFAS 119 (issued in 1991 and 1994, respectively) expanded the guidance for adequate 
disclosure of derivative information. SFAS 107 required, where practically estimable, the 
disclosure of derivative fair-values. SFAS 119 required the disclosure of derivative fair-
values along with disaggregated amounts classified by type and purpose of the position. 
 With SFAS 133 in 1998, FASB required the recognition of derivative fair-values 
either as an asset or a liability on the statement of financial position. Gains and losses on 
the derivative position are handled differently depending on how the instrument is 
designated. At inception, a derivative position must be designated as a fair-value hedge, 
cash-flow hedge, foreign currency hedge, or a non-hedge position. In cases where the 
                                                 
1 Differential opinions also arise from asymmetric access to information. In this study, I assume that 
information is commonly received within the event window (3 and 7 days) surrounding the announcement 
date.  
2 Efficient price discovery in the financial markets is a necessary and maintained assumption in this analysis. 
3 SFAS 52 (1981) and SFAS 80 (1984) dealt with specific derivative instruments. Instruments not 
specifically covered by these standards were generally treated in a way that was consistent with the intent of 
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derivative is used as a fair-value hedge, the gain or loss on the hedge is recorded in current 
earnings along with the fair-value gain or loss on the instrument being hedged. The net 
result is that the ineffective portion of the hedge is reported in current period earnings.4 
The gains and losses associated with cash-flow hedges are reported in current period 
earnings. Alternatively, gains and losses associated with foreign currency hedges are 
reported in other comprehensive income as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. If 
the derivative is not used as a hedge, then the gains and losses associated with that 
instrument are recorded in current period earnings. The effect of the statement is that 
derivative positions are now shown in the body of the statements, thus altering the reported 
position and income measures of the firm.5 The standard’s complexity and implementation 
challenges have caused FASB to issue several clarifying standards and establish the 
Derivatives Implementation Group to deal specifically with derivative accounting issues.6,7 
 Empirical studies find value-relevance (equity price and return) in the information 
reported under SFAS 119 and SFAS 133. Venkatachalam (1996) examines the value-
relevance of derivative disclosures required by SFAS 119. Through a cross-sectional 
analysis of banking institutions, he shows that the fair-value estimates of derivatives 
                                                 
 
these standards. Nonetheless, SFAS 105 represents the first formal broad standard that set disclosure 
requirements for derivatives as a class of financial instrument.     
4 The effectiveness of a hedge is the degree to which fluctuations in the fair-value of the hedged item are 
offset by the hedging derivative. A perfect hedge is a situation where fluctuations in the hedged items are 
exactly offset by fluctuations in the hedging derivative. The ineffective portion of a hedge is, therefore, the 
amount by which the fluctuation in the hedged item is over or under the fluctuation in the hedging derivative.     
5 Income measures here refers to the combined effect on Net income and Other Comprehensive Income 
6 SFAS 138, 157 and 161 were all issued subsequent to SFAS 133 with the intent of clarifying SFAS133. 
7 The Derivatives Implementation Group, the first of its kind, was established by FASB with the purpose of 
providing ongoing guidance and consultation relative to the implementation of derivative related standards. 
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(provided under SFAS 119) have a positive and significant relationship with market 
valuations of the firm. Seow and Tam (2002) find that the disclosure of credit exposures 
and fair-value gains and losses on derivatives required under SFAS 119 have a significant 
association with equity returns. Most recently, in an examination of banks that held 
derivative positions requiring disclosure under SFAS 119 and recognition under SFAS 
133, Ahmed, Kilic, and Lobo (2006) find that derivative fair-value recognition exhibit a 
significant positive relationship with equity valuation. They do not find significant 
coefficients on disclosed derivative fair-values. In the context of the prior studies, Ahmed 
et al., (2006) conclude that the disclosed derivative fair-values do not have incremental 
explanatory power of equity valuations in the presence of recognized derivative fair-
values. Taken together, these studies show that derivative fair-values are relevant to equity 
valuations and that the relationship between recognized derivative fair-value and equity 
valuations overpowers that of disclosed derivative fair-values.   
 The analysis of price response thus far in the literature shows that the aggregate 
market finds value-relevance in these disclosures and recognitions. Since equity price 
reflects the aggregate or average market belief, changes in equity prices and abnormal 
returns reflect the revision in the aggregate or average market belief  (Kim & Verrecchia, 
1991). However, market participant beliefs and belief revision patterns can be inferred 
from an analysis of equity price and returns only if market participants are assumed to (1) 
possess homogeneous prior beliefs and (2) follow a homogeneous (parallel) path of belief 
revision after an announcement patterns (Karpoff, 1986). 
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 An analysis of individual belief revisions is important since it shows how 
consistently the information is interpreted by market participants. When interpretations 
vary widely among investors, the reported information may not be clear or the ultimate 
valuation effect on the firm may not be commonly understood. To the extent that the 
standard is associated with widening differential beliefs among investors, the standard may 
induce asymmetry in the market.  
 Prior work suggests that increased trading volume is observed when investors 
revise their beliefs differentially (Bamber, Barron, & Stober, 1997, 1999; Karpoff, 1986; 
Kim & Verrecchia, 1991). As a result, the literature suggests that both price (consensus 
response) and volume reactions (belief revision response) should be examined when 
investigating the effect of information flows (Bamber & Cheon, 1995; Holthausen & 
Verrecchia, 1990; Morse, 1980; Ziebart, 1990). In these studies, consensus response is 
inferred from observed price response, and belief revision response is inferred from 
measures such as trading volume reaction, bid-ask spread, and dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts.  
 Due to the complexity of derivative instruments, the complexity of SFAS 133, 
differing capabilities and assumptions of individual investors, and the departure from 
historical cost measurement, I expect that heterogeneity in investors’ beliefs surrounding 
earnings announcements after the adoption of SFAS 133 is greater than before the 
adoption. Further, consistent with prior literature, I expect that the increase in 
heterogeneity of beliefs manifests as increased abnormal trading volume surrounding post-
SFAS 133 earnings announcements.  
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 Using a sample of banking organizations, I examine the relationships between the 
income effects of SFAS 133, three measures of investor belief dispersion identified by 
Bamber et al., (1997), and three measures of abnormal trading volume. I focus on banking 
organizations since it is this industry most generally affected by this standard. The analysis 
centers on the adoption of SFAS 133, which occurred from 1998 through 2001. Since I am 
interested in fully capturing the adoption period of SFAS 133, I collect data for the fiscal 
years ending 1996 through 2003 for all firms included in the sample.  
 My general expectations is that SFAS 133 compliant earnings announcements 
result in increased heterogeneity of beliefs and that this heterogeneity is observed as 
abnormal trading volume. I first test for differences in the levels of trading volume and 
belief heterogeneity between the pre-SFAS 133 and the post-SFAS 133 periods. Second, I 
test for the degree of association between belief dispersion and the income effects of SFAS 
133. Finally, I establish an association between belief dispersion attributable to the SFAS 
133 income effect and abnormal trading volume. 
 I find that the income effect of SFAS 133 is significantly related to belief 
heterogeneity among investors. The income and other comprehensive income effects of 
SFAS 133 are significantly related to levels of abnormal trading volume surrounding 
earnings announcements. Additionally, the income effect of SFAS 133 is significantly 
associated with three measures of belief heterogeneity derived from analysts’ forecasts. In 
an extended analysis I model the SFAS 133 income effects on abnormal volume using the 
three belief heterogeneity measures as the conduit. I find only weak support for two of the 
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three heterogeneity measures acting as a conduit for the effect of the income measures on 
abnormal volume.  
 The results of this study may be informative to standard-setters as they seek to meet 
the objective of providing information that is useful in making rational investment 
decisions.8 To the extent that investors’ decisions seem less consistent and belief revisions 
become more divergent subsequent to issuing the fair-value standard, policy makers may 
need to either re-evaluate the ultimate purpose of such a standard, or evaluate the method 
by which the standard is implemented. In either case, standard-setters should be concerned 
not only with the consensus reaction (price) but also with the effect certain reporting has 
on individual investor’s beliefs and belief revisions. Regulators may find it informative to 
evaluate the effect derivative fair-value reporting has on asymmetry among investors and 
the observed abnormal volume.9    
 This study contributes to the literature on derivative reporting by evaluating the 
effect fair-value derivative reporting has on investors’ beliefs and trading volume. While 
prior studies have demonstrated the value-relevance of derivative reporting through the 
examination of equity prices (Ahmed et al., 2006), the literature provides no information 
on how these fair-value standards affect the informational landscape for individual market 
participants. Through an examination of investor belief revisions and the related trading 
                                                 
8 Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 1 (FASB, 1978), states that ‘Financial reporting should 
provide information that is useful to present and potential investors and creditors and other users in making 
rational investment, credit, and similar decisions.’ 
9 In a June 2000 address to the American Conference Institute, Commissioner Laura Unger stated “... we 
have to remember that information can only empower investors if they understand it and can effect apply it. 
Access to information is no substitute for knowing how to interpret it.” 
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volume, I explore how belief heterogeneity may be induced by SFAS 133. Several 
researchers posit that, since price and trading volume reflect different information about 
the effect of announced data, value-relevance research should evaluate both price and 
volume effects (Bamber & Cheon, 1995; Karpoff, 1987). Yet, no prior studies have 
examined the investor belief revision and trading volume patterns associated with the 
application of fair-value recognition of derivatives on financial statements.  
 The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature dealing with fair-value standards, heterogeneity of investors’ beliefs, and 
analysts’ forecasts. Chapter 3 provides a theoretical basis and motivation for the 
hypothesis. Chapter 4 describes the methodology, empirical models, and data sources used 
in, my examination.  Chapter 5 presents the results of the analysis and the resultant 
implications. Chapter 6 concludes the analysis and identifies the limitations of the study as 
well as potential future areas of research.  
  9
II Literature Review 
Background 
 There are three primary streams of research relevant to this study. The first stream 
of research deals with the fair-value reporting of derivatives. Generally these studies have 
provided empirical evidence that both notional and fair-value information is relevant to the 
level and change in equity prices.10 Second, several studies have examined the information 
contained in trading volume incremental to the information contained in valuation (equity 
price and return) studies alone. These studies have generally demonstrated that where 
examination of price provides information on the aggregate market response, an analysis of 
trading volume yields insights into the dispersion of beliefs around the aggregate response. 
The third body of research relevant to this study deals with analysts’ forecasts. These 
studies examine the degree to which analyst forecast error and the dispersion of analysts’ 
forecasts provide insights into the clarity of the informational landscape in which 
investment decisions are made. Each of these research streams is now discussed in greater 
detail. 
                                                 
10 The notional amount (or notional principal amount or notional value) on a financial instrument is the 
nominal or face amount that is used to calculate payments made on that instrument. This amount generally 
does not change hands and is thus referred to as notional. In a bond, the buyer pays the principal amount at 
issue (start), then receives coupons (computed off this principal) over the life of the bond, then receives the 
principal back at maturity (end). In a swap (a type of derivative position), no principal changes hands at 
inception (start) or expiry (end), and in the meantime, interest payments are computed based on a notional 
amount, which acts as if it were the principal of a bond, hence the term notional principal amount, 
abbreviated to notional.  
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Value-Relevance of Derivative Reporting 
 Nelson (1996) examines the usefulness of the disclosures required under SFAS 107 
in assessing the market value of common equity. She finds that the fair value of securities, 
whether included on the financial statements or not, was unrelated to the firm’s equity 
valuations after controlling for future earnings.  
 In contrast to Nelson (1996), Barth (1996) finds evidence that fair-valuations 
explain market valuation premiums over book values even when bank-specific effects 
(regulatory capital requirements, deposit profile, etc) are included as control variables. 
However, she finds that off-balance sheet items (derivatives) are not significant in 
explaining the market-value versus book-value premium assigned by the market. While the 
two studies conflict with regard to the relationship between equity valuation and fair-
valued assets, both conclude that footnote disclosures prior to SFAS 107 did not provide 
valuable information to the market. 
 Venkatachalam (1996) also finds that fair-value disclosure was value-relevant in 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in bank stock prices. Notional amounts of the 
derivative instruments also provided incremental information even in the presence of the 
fair-value information. The model specification used in the study treated disclosed and 
recognized information as equivalents, such that the coefficients on disclosures and 
recognitions were the same. Therefore, the results of the study reflect the different value-
relevance of content (notional vs fair-value) rather than reporting method (disclosure vs. 
recognition).  
  11
 In a study of international manufacturing firms, Wong (2000), finds a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between the notional derivative disclosures required 
under SFAS 119 and the foreign exchange risk exposure of the firm. He concludes that 
investors can use the disclosed notional information to evaluate the foreign exchange 
exposure of the firm since the notional value of the firm’s derivative positions (hedges) is 
related to the level of foreign exchange rate exposure. 
 Moses (2002) identifies the conflict in prior literature regarding the value-relevance 
of fair-value disclosure (e.g. Barth et al., (1996) and Nelson (1996)) and finds that 
disclosures arising from SFAS 119 are value-relevant. The valuation model employed by 
Moses effectively controls for variables omitted in the literature prior to his study. 
Specifically, the difference between book- and market-value is used in earlier models 
without controlling for unique, firm-specific variables. Failure to control for these unique 
factors may have obscured the relationship under examination and may be the reason for 
the lack of significance in prior studies. 
 Seow and Tam (2002) also examine the value-relevance of SFAS 119 and attempt 
to remedy the omitted variable problem by controlling for firm-specific market beta. In 
their model, the firm-specific market beta is used to capture the firm-specific aspects not 
explicitly represented in the model. The derivative fair-values reported in footnote 
disclosures have a significant relationship with observed market returns for the period 
following the disclosure. They conclude that SFAS 119 disclosure requirements 
represented improved transparency to the investor and convey valuable information 
relative to observed returns. 
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 Wang, Alam, and Makar (2005) examine the value relevance of notional 
disclosures required under SFAS 119 when fair-value information was also available. They 
find that the value relevance of notional derivative information was robust to the inclusion 
of fair-value information. In conjunction with Seow and Tam (2002), their results indicate 
that both the notional and fair-value reporting of derivatives are individually and jointly 
relevant for investors in evaluating future prospects of the firm. 
 Most recently, Ahmed et al. (2006) examine the value relevance of disclosure 
versus recognition with regard to SFAS 133. Using a sample of banking organizations, 
they examine the effect of SFAS 133 recognitions on the equity price level and return. 
More specifically, by examining those institutions that held risk management derivatives 
both before and after the adoption of SFAS 133, they are able to demonstrate the 
incremental value-relevance of the post SFAS 133 recognitions.  They find that while the 
coefficients estimated for disclosed derivative information are not significant, the 
estimated coefficients on recognized derivative information are significant. This evidence 
indicates that the recognition of derivative fair-values provides value-relevant information 
to market participants. 
Trading Volume and Belief Heterogeneity  
 As early as Bachelier (1900), researchers have hypothesized that changes in price 
level and changes in the level of trading volume could provide insights into different 
aspects of investor opinions about firm value. Beaver (1968) claims that isolating the 
volume effect is necessary to distinguish between market consensus changes and 
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individuals’ expectation changes. As such, Beaver (1968) implies that volume provides 
insights into the differential interpretation of information while price indicates the 
consensus interpretation of information. 
 Karpoff (1987) in an analytical examination of trading volume, concludes that 
abnormal trading volume does not necessarily imply disagreement regarding the newly 
available information. He shows that identical interpretation of new information when 
prior expectations were divergent could also give rise to abnormal trading as investors 
revise beliefs. To the extent that investors have homogeneous priors and homogeneous 
belief revisions arising from the new information, volume is merely a noisy artifact of 
market dynamics and contains no information. However, when prior beliefs and revisions 
are not homogeneous, volume may offer insight into the revision patterns of investors, and 
therefore, the degree to which investors similarly interpret information ((Bamber et al., 
1999; Karpoff, 1987; Kim & Verrecchia, 2001). 
 Holthausen and Verrecchia (1990) introduce the notions of consensus and 
informedness. Consensus refers to the level of agreement among market participants at the 
release of new information, and informedness refers to the extent that participants become 
more knowledgeable at the point of information release. Both effects occur at the release of 
information, and the joint evaluation of price and volume reveals which of these two 
effects dominate the trading environment. An increase in informedness is inferred when 
the variance of unexpected price change and changes in trading volume are positively 
related. When the variance of unexpected price change and changes in trading volume are 
negatively related, the consensus effect dominates. This study introduces a conceptual joint 
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interpretation of price and volume effects in the trading environment, but relies on the 
condition of homogeneous priors. 
 Ziebart (1990) finds that changes in abnormal trading volume are positively 
associated with both the changes belief dispersion and the change in the aggregate belief 
revision. He operationalizes belief dispersion as dispersion in analysts’ forecasts and 
aggregate belief revision as the absolute value of the change in analysts mean forecast. 
Both belief dispersion and aggregate belief revision are jointly significant in the 
explanation of abnormal trading volume. Therefore, belief dispersion has incremental 
explanatory power for abnormal trading volume even after controlling for aggregate belief 
revisions. 
 Kim and Verrecchia (1991) find that the unexpected volume and the variance of 
price change are increasing functions of the precision of the announced information and 
decreasing functions of the amount of preannouncement public and private information. 
Investors are diversely informed and differ in the precision of their prior information (prior 
beliefs). Therefore, investors respond differently (heterogeneous belief revisions) to new 
information and this leads to positive trading volume effects. They assert that trading 
volume contains the differences among investors which are averaged out in the return data. 
Therefore, the examination of volume information in conjunction with returns information 
may identify systematic differences in investors’ knowledge or other characteristics giving 
rise to different reactions across firms and types of announcements.  
 Abarbanell (1995) claims that inferences from studies using changes in forecast 
dispersion are threatened by the failure to control for the magnitude of price changes. Since 
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the information released will likely affect both the trading volume and changes in forecast 
dispersion, including the magnitude of price change in the model is necessary to isolate the 
belief revision effect inferred from forecast revisions.  
 Bamber & Cheon (1995) investigate the relationship between the magnitude of 
equity price movement and the corresponding trading volume. They find that, on average, 
there exists a positive relationship between the magnitudes of price and volume reactions. 
However, in approximately 25 percent of the cases, the magnitude of price movement is 
different than the magnitude of volume movement. They report that the results of their 
study are broadly consistent with the idea that trading volume reaction is likely high 
(relative to price reaction) when the announcement generates differential belief revisions 
among individual investors.  
 Bamber et al.,(1997) investigate three distinct aspects of investor disagreement 
(heterogeneity of beliefs). They show that each of the measures (dispersion in prior beliefs, 
change in dispersion, and belief jumbling) plays an incremental role in explaining investor 
disagreement. Additionally, they note that each of these measures provides incremental 
explanatory power for abnormal trading volume. The dispersion in prior beliefs refers to 
the a priori disagreement among market participants prior to the release of new 
information. Larger prior dispersion leads to greater belief revision after information 
release and, therefore, larger trading volume. Belief jumbling occurs when market 
participants revise beliefs differentially from other market participants. This shows that the 
newly arrived information is processed and interpreted differently by individual market 
participants, thus causing the formulation of differential beliefs. Under conditions of 
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jumbling, Bamber et al., (1997) found increased trading volume. Finally, the change in 
dispersion reflects the extent to which beliefs are, on average diverging (versus 
converging) around earnings announcements. As beliefs diverge, the degree of 
disagreement is increasing, and increased trading volume is observed. 
 In an examination of trading volume under speculative conditions, Kandel and 
Pearson (1995) show that models restricting market participants to common (or 
homogeneous) interpretation of commonly received information are overly restrictive. 
Along the same lines, Bamber, Barron and Stober (1999) identify two conditions under 
which differential interpretations explain a significant amount of the earnings 
announcement period trading volume. First, they show that trading coincidental with small 
price changes reflects differential interpretation of the information by investors. Second, 
differential interpretation is also significantly related to trading volume where trading 
volume is higher than the firm-specific non-announcement period trading volume. This 
study specifically identifies the importance of inventors’ differential priors and differential 
interpretations when evaluating belief heterogeneity and its effect on trading volume.  
 Tkac (1999) finds that excess turnover (abnormal trading volume) is positively 
related to option availability and institutional ownership. Firm size is also influential, but 
the relationship was negative. 
Cready and Hurtt (2002) demonstrate that volume-based metrics provide a stronger 
test of investor reaction than the conventional return-based metrics. As a result, they 
conclude that studies designed to detect investor response should include an examination 
of both return-based and trading-based metrics. 
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Literature in this stream of research shows the importance of examining both price 
and trading volume effects and how differential beliefs and belief revisions are manifest in 
trading volume. 
Dispersion of Analyst Forecast and Belief Heterogeneity 
 Dispersion in analysts’ forecasts, reflecting differential beliefs of analysts, has been 
examined in prior literature (Abarbanell, 1995; Bamber et al., 1997, 1999; Chaing, 2005; 
Irani & Karamanou, 2003; Rich, Raymond, & Butler, 1992).  Additionally, these studies 
apply the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as a proxy for the general level of dispersion 
(belief heterogeneity) among market participants. Daley, Senkow and Vigeland  (1988) 
specifically examine the use of analysts’ forecasts as an ex ante measure of aggregate 
market uncertainty. They find that variance in analysts forecasts are a useful indicator of 
the aggregate markets uncertainty surrounding earnings announcements. 
 The source of differential beliefs is unobservable and may result from asymmetrical 
information and/or the differential processing of the same information (Barron, 1995; Kim 
& Verrecchia, 2001). Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) examine the relationship between 
forecast dispersion and mean forecast revisions with trade volume. The results of this study 
indicate a significant positive relation between the dispersion of analysts’ forecasts of 
annual EPS and the volume of trading. The relationship holds even after controlling for the 
volume effect of the magnitude of monthly revisions in the mean analysts forecast. That is, 
even after controlling for the surprise effect of the revisions, the dispersion of forecasts (a 
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proxy for heterogeneity of beliefs) provides significant explanatory power for trading 
volume.   
 In a study of forecast dispersion and the underlying uncertainty of the forecast, 
Rich et al. (1992) examine the inflation expectations of analysts. They show that the 
forecast dispersion across respondents to the survey is positively and significantly 
associated with the measures of inflation uncertainty. While their results are tempered with 
sensitivity to the survey series used, the findings nonetheless, show that uncertainty 
manifests as dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
 Barron (1995) extends the belief revision literature by isolating the differential 
belief revision effect. He measures differential belief revisions as the degree to which 
individual analyst forecasts are ordered (ranked) differently after the announcement than 
before the announcement. Consistent with Karpoff’s (1986) supposition, Barron (1995) 
found that differential prior beliefs and differential belief revisions both demonstrated 
incremental explanatory power for variations in trading volume. 
 Diether, Malloy, and Scherbina (2002) find a negative relationship between analyst 
forecast dispersion and future expected returns. Similarly, Athanassakos and Kalimipalli 
(2003) found that analyst forecast dispersion was related to future return volatility. 
Together these studies indicate that the ex-ante uncertainty, observed ex-post as volatility 
in stock return, is associated with the level of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
 Hope (2003) found that a firm’s disclosure of accounting policy was associated 
with reduced forecast dispersion. The finding suggests that as the transparency of a firm’s 
reporting increases, the analysts’ uncertainty is reduced, and more common (consensus) 
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forecasts are rendered.  Benrud (2007) in an analytical examination of dispersion, shows 
that both an increase in the cost of information and a decrease in the availability of 
information give rise to increased dispersion of analysts’ forecasts. Therefore, several 
studies have used analyst forecasts as a proxy measure for belief heterogeneity in the 
market.    
 The preceding streams of research provide the basis for the development of this 
study’s hypotheses. In anticipation of increased belief heterogeneity induced by SFAS 133 
compliant earnings announcements, I hypothesize that the income effects of SFAS 133 are 
associated with increased trading volume. The hypotheses are now formally developed.  
  
.  
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III Hypothesis Development 
 
 Earnings announcements associated with SFAS 133 are expected to give rise to 
differential beliefs for four primary reasons. First, derivatives may be the most complex 
and least generally understood of all financial instruments. These instruments have little or 
no initial cost, and yet, can represent significant claims or liabilities to the firm. Actual 
performance of the derivative position is typically driven by specific contractual 
arrangements sensitive to fluctuations in underlying economic conditions (e.g. interest 
rates and default rates) or other performance conditions (e.g. delivery of a commodity, 
default). Understanding the net position is further complicated when the derivative is a 
hedge. Under hedge conditions, evaluating the true exposure of the firm requires an 
understanding of the hedged item, the conditions that change its value, and the degree to 
which the hedging derivative offsets the fluctuation in the hedged item. As such, 
understanding the specific conditions that drive the value of a given derivative position, 
and understanding the appropriate assumptions to use in assessing that derivative positions 
are not trivial. Given this inherent complexity of derivatives and their use, I expect market 
participants to develop differential opinions about the effect these instruments have on the 
firm. 
 Second, the complexity of accounting treatment prescribed in the standard may 
evoke differential evaluations by investors. The reporting of gains and losses on the 
derivative position depends on how the derivative is designated. At inception, a derivative 
position must be designated as a fair-value hedge, cash-flow hedge, foreign currency 
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hedge, or non-hedge. In cases where the derivative is used as a fair-value hedge, the gain 
or loss on the hedge is recorded in current earnings along with the fair-value gain or loss 
on the instrument being hedged. The net result is that the ineffective portion of the hedge is 
reported in current period earnings.11 The gains and losses associated with cash-flow 
hedges are reported in current period earnings. Alternatively, gains and losses associated 
with foreign currency hedges are reported in other comprehensive income as part of the 
cumulative translation adjustment. If the derivative is not used as a hedge, then the gains 
and losses associated with that instrument are recorded in current period earnings. The 
effect of the statement is that derivative positions are now shown in the body of the 
statements, thus altering the reported position and income of the firm. As a result, the 
meaning of fluctuations in fair-value and related income effects may be unclear, causing 
investors to make differential evaluations. 
 Third, commonly received information can, and generally is, interpreted differently 
by market participants. Investors possess different evaluative capability and experience and 
will apply different underlying assumptions when interpreting financial results. The 
uncertainly induced by the very nature of derivatives and the complexity of the standard 
may accentuate differences among investors’ interpretations. Further, given the sensitivity 
of derivative fair-values to underlying assumptions and the difficulty in parsing permanent 
                                                 
11 The effectiveness of a hedge is the degree to which fluctuations in the fair-value of the hedged item is 
offset by the hedging derivative. A perfect hedge is a situation where fluctuations in the hedged items are 
exactly offset by fluctuations in the hedging derivative. The ineffective portion of a hedge is, therefore, the 
amount by which the fluctuation in the hedged item is over or under the fluctuation in the hedging derivative. 
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and transitory income effects from derivatives, I predict the heterogeneity in investors’ 
beliefs to increase after adoption of SFAS 133. 
 Finally, as the justification for historical cost accounting finds its roots in reliability 
and freedom from bias, a departure from an historical cost basis introduces the potential for 
reduced reliability and increased bias. The action by FASB following the introduction of 
SFAS 133 supports this concern. To clarify SFAS 133, FASB has issued SFAS 138, SFAS 
157, and SFAS 161 (issued in 2000, 2006, and 2008, respectively). All of these subsequent 
standards are designed to clarify the valuation and financial accounting treatment of 
derivatives prescribed in the original standard. Each of these standards specifically 
addresses some aspect of SFAS 133 and provides modification or continuations of its 
applicability. Additionally, due to the complexity of the issues surrounding implementation 
of SFAS 133, FASB has instituted the Derivatives Implementation Group.  The first of its 
kind, the purpose of the group is to provide ongoing guidance and consultation relative to 
the implementation of derivative related standards. The significant effort invested in 
clarifying SFAS 133 shows that the promulgating body believes that the standard has the 
potential to evoke inconsistent treatment and interpretation. 
 Ahmed et al., (2006) find that, based on observed equity prices and equity returns, 
the recognitions required under SFAS 133 generated a balance sheet effect that is value 
relevant.12 They find differences between the coefficient on the fair-value of disclosed 
derivatives prior to SFAS 133 implementation and the coefficient on the fair-value of 
                                                 
12 Ahmed et al., (2006) utilize the fair-value of financial assets and the fair-value of financial liabilities as the 
measure of the effect of SFAS 133. These measures will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4. 
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recognized derivatives after SFAS 133 implementation. The current study examines the 
effect of the earnings announcements under SFAS 133 on the differential beliefs of market 
participants and abnormal volume. Recognizing derivatives under SFAS 133 affects both 
Net Income (NI) and Other Comprehensive Income (OCI). The fair-value changes that 
affect both measures of income not only have the potential for reversal in subsequent 
periods, but also involve reclassification from OCI to NI under certain conditions. 
Additionally, the portion of fair value changes deemed to be associated with the ineffective 
portion of the hedge is not necessarily stable across time. In all of these cases, the OCI and 
NI effects are dependent on the underlying assumptions employed by the preparer. Market 
participants can be expected to evaluate the same information differentially and arrive at 
differential conclusions regarding the prospects of the firm. As a result, the changes in the 
fair-value of derivatives included in NI and OCI will be sources of differential beliefs. 
Given the inherent complexity of derivative instruments, the multifaceted nature of the 
standard, and the difficulty in interpreting the financial results reported under SFAS 133, I 
expect that the incremental income effect of SFAS 133 is related to differential beliefs held 
by market participants. 
 Bamber et al., (1997) identify three distinctly different aspects of differential 
beliefs; prior dispersion, change in dispersion, and belief jumbling. They report that 
trading volume around earnings announcements is increasing in prior dispersion, changes 
in dispersion, and belief jumbling after controlling for the magnitude of the 
contemporaneous price change. First, prior dispersion refers to market participants holding 
different beliefs about a firm and its prospects prior to the earnings announcement. This 
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pre-existing dispersion in beliefs reflects the general disagreement that exists among 
investors prior to release of the new information. Upon release of the new information 
beliefs will either be confirmed or refuted. Other things equal, large prior belief dispersion 
will lead to a large magnitude of belief revision as market participants revise their views to 
be in line with the new information. Increased magnitudes of belief revisions drive the 
propensity to trade and result in the observed increase in abnormal volume. Given the 
complex valuation methods and reporting for changes in the fair-value of derivatives under 
SFAS 133 market participants can be expected to develop different prior views about the 
impending SFAS 133 compliant earnings announcements. Therefore, I anticipate increased 
belief dispersion prior to SFAS 133 compliant earnings announcement. My first set of 
hypotheses (in alternate form) is: 
 
H1a: The belief dispersion prior to earnings announcements in 
the post-SFAS 133 periods is larger than that in the pre-SFAS 
133 periods. 
   
H1b: The belief dispersion prior to earnings announcements in 
the post-SFAS 133 periods is positively related to the magnitude 
of NI and OCI attributable to SFAS 133.   
 
 
 The second measure of differential beliefs used in the study is the change in belief 
dispersion. This measures the degree to which the announced information gives rise to 
more or less divergence in beliefs. That is, when post-announcement dispersion of beliefs 
is larger than pre-announcement dispersion of beliefs, then a positive change in belief 
dispersion has occurred. Where pre-announcement dispersion of beliefs measures the a 
priori disagreement among market participants, the change in belief dispersion measures 
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the effect the new information has on the dispersion of beliefs among market participants. 
A positive change in dispersion of beliefs surrounding an announcement is interpreted as 
evidence that the new information has exacerbated the divergence of opinion in the market 
(Bamber et al., 1997, 1999). As divergence of opinion increases, the propensity to trade 
also increases since investors will seek to take equity positions consistent with the newly 
determined post-announcement beliefs. 
 I argue that the introduction of SFAS 133 is expected to give rise to a positive 
change in dispersion surrounding earnings announcements. Under the provisions of SFAS 
133, changes in the fair-value of derivatives are handled as either an adjustment to capital 
through Other Comprehensive Income (OCI) or are reported in current Net Income (NI). 
The conditions that determine which classification is used depend on whether or not the 
derivative position is a hedge and if any portion of the hedge is considered ineffective. 
While the initial classification is likely to induce some level of belief heterogeneity, it is 
the unpredictable changes in these classifications from period to period that I believe will 
contribute significantly to heterogeneity of beliefs. The fair-value changes that affect both 
measures of income not only have the potential for reversal in subsequent periods, but also 
involve reclassification from OCI to NI under certain conditions. Additionally, the portion 
of fair value changes deemed to be associated with the ineffective portion of the hedge is 
not necessarily stable across time. In all of these cases, the OCI and NI effects are 
dependent on the underlying assumptions employed by the preparer. Market participants 
can be expected to evaluate the same information differentially and arrive at heterogeneous 
conclusions regarding the prospects of the firm. As a result, the changes in the fair-value of 
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derivatives included in NI and OCI will be sources of differential beliefs. Therefore, I 
expect a positive change in belief dispersion surrounding SFAS 133 compliant earnings 
announcements, and that this positive change is more pronounced than is the case for pre-
SFAS 133 earnings announcements. My second set of hypotheses (in alternate form) is: 
 
H2a: The change in belief dispersion surrounding earnings 
announcements in the post-SFAS 133 periods is larger 
(exhibiting less convergence) than that in the pre-SFAS 133 
periods. 
 
H2b: The change in belief dispersion surrounding earnings 
announcements in the post-SFAS 133 periods is positively 
related to the magnitude of NI and OCI attributable to SFAS 
133. 
 
 The third component of differential beliefs is belief jumbling and refers to the 
belief revision pattern for market participants. When the belief revision patterns (from pre-
announcement to post-announcement) are not parallel and belief revision paths cross (such 
that the most optimistic prior to the announcement is not the most optimistic after the 
announcement), jumbling has occurred. Alternatively, when participants modify their 
beliefs of a firm’s prospects in a parallel fashion (meaning the rank order of the 
participants’ beliefs do not change), then jumbling has not occurred. When market 
participants’ beliefs change rank order relative to an informational release, then they are 
differentially revising their opinions. Belief jumbling may occur when an announcement 
fails to remove informational disadvantages, or conveys private information to a subset of 
market participants who possess advantages in processing information (Bamber et al., 
1997). Where participants in the market may have differential skills in interpreting newly 
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released information, jumbling is likely to be observed. This reflects the effect of different 
interpretations of commonly received information as described by Barron (1995). 
 Given the complexity of the standard, the sensitivity of financial results to 
underlying assumptions and the volatility of NI and OCI results, I expect that some 
participants are more expert in discerning which derivative information is relevant and in 
drawing conclusions from that information. As a result, belief jumbling surrounding 
earnings announcements should be more pronounced in the post-SFAS 133 periods than in 
the pre-SFAS 133 announcement periods. My third set of hypotheses (in alternate form) is:  
 
H3a: The degree of belief jumbling surrounding earnings 
announcements in the post-SFAS 133 periods is larger than that 
in the pre-SFAS 133 periods. 
 
H3b: The degree of belief jumbling surrounding earnings 
announcements in the post-SFAS 133 periods is positively 
related to the magnitude of NI and OCI attributable to SFAS 
133.  
 
 Bamber et al. (1997; 1999) have shown that all the three measures of disagreement 
are incrementally valuable in explaining abnormal trading volume. Further, trading volume 
around earnings announcements is increasing in all three of these measures (Bamber et al., 
1997). Consistent with prior research, each of the three belief dispersion measures is 
expected to provide incremental explanatory power for observed abnormal volume. The 
first three hypotheses tested for a relationship between SFAS 133 income effects and each 
measure of belief heterogeneity. Hypothesis four is designed to directly test the underlying 
assertion of this paper; that post-SFAS 133 earnings announcements result in increased 
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heterogeneity of beliefs and that this heterogeneity manifests as abnormal trading volume. 
 As discussed in greater detail in the Methodology section, I separate the portion of 
belief heterogeneity explained by the SFAS 133 income effects and the portion of belief 
heterogeneity attributable to other factors. The parsed heterogeneity metrics (the portion 
related to SFAS 133, and the portion related to all other factors) are then used as 
independent variables in a model designed to explain abnormal volume. Consistent with 
prior hypotheses, I expect SFAS 133 income effects to induce incremental belief 
heterogeneity, and this additional heterogeneity, in turn, has explanatory power for 
abnormal volume. My last three hypotheses are formally stated (in alternate form):  
 
H1c: Belief dispersion attributable to SFAS 133 is positively 
associated with abnormal trading volume around earnings 
announcements in the post SFAS 133 period. 
 
H2c: Change in belief dispersion attributable to SFAS 133 is 
positively associated with abnormal trading volume around 
earnings announcements in the post SFAS 133 period. 
 
H3c: Jumbling attributable to SFAS 133 is positively associated 
with abnormal trading volume around earnings announcements 
in the post SFAS 133 period. 
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IV Methodology 
Data Sources and Sample Selection 
 The sample consists of banks and bank holding companies for which SFAS 133 
applies. To be included in the sample, the bank or bank holding company must (1) use 
derivatives for non-trading purposes, (2) be publicly traded, (3) have 10K reports on 
LexisNexis, (4) have annual observations in the Bank Regulatory database for two years 
before and two years after the adoption of SFAS 133, (5) have analysts’ forecasts available 
from I/B/E/S, and (6) have data reported in the Compustat and Center for Research in 
Security Prices (CRSP) databases. Since SFAS 133 was adopted at the firm’s discretion 
between 1998 and 2001, I included data for all firms from 1996 to 2003. The data set, 
therefore, includes two years of data before any firm adopted SFAS 133, and two years 
after all firms had adopted SFAS 133.13 Stock price, equity return, and trading volume data 
were obtained from CRSP. The effect of derivative reporting under SFAS133 was 
collected manually from firm 10Ks reported through the SEC and FRY-9 reports from the 
Bank Regulatory database. Analyst forecast information is taken from First Call and 
I/B/E/S. Based on the preceding selection criteria, and data availability, a sample of 51 
firms representing 223 firm-years is used. Of the surviving 51 firms, all adopted SFAS 133 
for the 2001 fiscal year. Therefore, the sample does not include any early adopters.     
                                                 
13 The data, therefore, fully accounts for the entire period over which SFAS 133 was adopted.  
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Measures 
Heterogeneity of Beliefs 
 According to Bamber (1997), the heterogeneity of investor’s beliefs has three 
aspects. I compute the disagreement measures in accordance with Bamber (1997) using 
analysts’ forecasts and changes in those forecasts. First, dispersion in prior beliefs (DISP) 
refers to the a priori disagreement among market participants prior to the release of new 
information. It is measured as the pre-announcement standard deviation of analysts’ 
forecasts of annual earnings divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast14.  For 
consistency with Ajinkya, Atiase, and Gift (1991) and Barron (1995), only analysts’ 
forecasts issued within 45 days of the announcement are included. Due to normality issues 
and for consistency with Bamber et al. (1997), I use the log-transformed measure (LDISP). 
 The change in forecast dispersion reflects the extent to which beliefs are, on 
average, diverging (converging) around earnings announcements (Bamber et al., 1997). 
This metric is computed by first computing the post-announcement standard deviation of 
analysts’ forecasts based on all forecasts generated within 30 days following an 
announcement. From this I subtract the pre-announcement standard deviation computed on 
all analysts forecasts issued within 45 days before the announcement. The change in 
standard deviation is then divided by the absolute value of the mean pre-announcement 
forecast and is denoted as ∆DISP.  
                                                 
14 The absolute value of analyst mean forecast is used to avoid the computation of a negative dispersion, and 
directly follows Bamber et al.,(1999) 
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 Belief jumbling occurs when individual investor’s expectations change relative to 
that of other investors. Following Barron (1995), I measure jumbling around an 
announcement as the complement of the correlation (Spearman) between the relative 
position of individual analyst’s pre-announcement forecasts and post-announcement 
forecasts. The pre-announcement forecasts are those that were issued within 45 days of the 
announcement and the post-announcement forecasts are those issued within 30 days 
following the announcement. I order the forecasts from lowest to highest, compute the 
Spearman correlation (ρ), and then subtract the estimate of ρ from 1 to obtain the measure 
of jumbling. Consistent with Bamber et al., (1997), the lognormal transformation of the 
resulting measure is used in the analysis.15  
Fair-Value Measures 
 Aspects of the earnings announcement that are suspected of driving the re-
evaluation of firm prospects are the Net Income and Other Comprehensive Income effects 
of derivative fair valuation. The two major income components of interest are Net Income 
before Extra Ordinary Items (NI) and Other Comprehensive Income (OCI).  For this study, 
both income measures are separated into the SFAS 133 component, and the non-SFAS 133 
component. I decompose NI into the SFAS 133 portion (DNI) and the non-SFAS 133 
portion (NDNI). Similarly, I decompose OCI into a SFAS 133 portion (DOCI) and the 
non-SFAS 133 portion (NDOCI). The sum of DNI and DOCI, then, represents the total 
                                                 
15 Bamber et al., (1997) use ln(1.1 - ρ) to avoid taking the log of zero when ρ=1. 
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income effect of SFAS 133. All of the income effect variables, DNI, DOCI, NDNI, and 
NDOCI, are scaled on number of shares outstanding. 
Abnormal Volume 
 To evaluate the volume effect I establish three alternative measures grounded in 
prior literature. I initially employ a 3-day event window (-1 to +1) to examine the 
abnormal volume surrounding earnings announcements. Additionally, I repeat the analysis 
with a 7-day event window (-1 to +5) since prior research has shown that abnormally high 
trading volume persists for at least 5 days following the event (Morse, 1980). All three 
measures require the estimate of normal trading volume which is based on a non-
announcement period beginning the 50th trading day prior to the announcement date and 
ending the 10th day prior to the announcement date. Exclusion of the 10 trading days 
before the announcement is consistent with Bamber and Cheon (1995).16 The same non-
announcement period is used for both the 3-day and 7-day abnormal volume metrics. 
  For the first and second measures of abnormal volume, I estimate the normal 
liquidity trading volume for the firms, and then predict the normal volume during the 
announcement period. The difference between the estimated normal volume and the actual 
trade volume is taken as the abnormal volume during the announcement period. 
 The first measure of abnormal volume is based on a cross-sectional, two-way fixed 
effect estimation. Following Bamber et al. (1997), I include of controls for market-wide 
                                                 
16 Bamber and Cheon (1995) computed normal liquidity volume for a firm by excluding the trading volume 
for the 21 days surrounding an earnings announcement. They exclude observations 10 days prior and 10 days 
subsequent to earnings announcement. 
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trading (MKTVOL) and firm size (MVE). Also consistent with Bamber et al. (1997), I use 
the natural log of both control variables. Utama and Cready (1997) utilize year dummy 
variables to allow for different year-effects in normal trading volume over time. 
Accordingly, I control for year-specific effects by including year-effects (YE) in the 
model. Finally, to allow for firm-specific effects that may be related to volume, I include 
firm-effects (FE) estimation in my model. 
 Using the non-announcement period defined earlier (beginning 50 trading day prior 
to the announcement date and ending the 10 days prior to the announcement date), I 
estimate equation 2 for the non-announcement period. Using the estimated coefficients 
from equation 2, I predict the daily trading volume for firm i ( ∧V id ) during the 3-day (7-
day) announcement period. The sum of the predicted daily volume through the 
announcement period is the estimated volume for the announcement period (EVit). The 
sum of the actual daily volume (V id ) through the announcement period is the actual 
announcement period trade volume (Vit). Abnormal trading volume for firm i during 
announcement period t (AV_FEit) is the difference between the actual volume (Vit) over 
the announcement window and the predicted volume (EVit) over the announcement 
window. The subscript i represents the firm and the subscript t represents the 
announcement period. Since the study examines a total of six annual earnings 
announcements for each firm, the subscript t will take on a value of one to seven for each 
firm.  Equation 2 is estimated using a cross-sectional panel data set. 
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 Where;  
Vid =daily trading volume as a percentage of shares outstanding for 
firm i on day d 
LN_MKTVOLd=daily market trading volume as a percentage of 
shares outstanding in the market on day d 
LN_MVEit=market value of equity for firm i in year t measured at 
the end of the day before the annual announcement date 
FEi = firm-effect estimator for firm i 
YEt = year-effect estimator for year t 
Vit= actual trading volume as a percentage of shares outstanding for 
firm i during announcement period t 
∧
V id = predicted trading volume as a percentage of shares 
outstanding for firm i during announcement period t 
EVit = sum of 
∧
V id over the 3-day and 7-day windows representing 
the estimated trading volume as a percentage of shares outstanding 
for firm i during the announcement period in year t 
AV_FEit = the difference between Vit  and  EVit  for firm i during 
announcement period t  
 
   
 The second measure for abnormal volume closely follows Cready and Hurtt (2002).  
They control for market and idiosyncratic trading volume with the use of a serially 
correlated regression (time-series) which regresses the log of the percent of shares traded 
for firm i on day d on the log of the percent of shares traded for firm i in day d-1 and the 
log of the percent of shares traded for the market on day d. In their 2002 study, Cready and 
Hurtt examine alternative measures of investor reaction surrounding earnings 
announcements. They test both trading volume and equity return metrics. They conclude 
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that volume measures, and in particular the one I employ here, are superior in correctly 
rejecting the null hypothesis of no investor response. Consistent with their approach, I 
estimate the following first order auto-regressive model separately for each firm for the 
non-announcement period. I use the same non-announcement period definitions used 
before: 
    Vid = β0i + β1iVid-1 + β2iMVid + εid              (6) 
 
 Based on the estimated model, I forecast the estimates of firm daily volume 
through the announcement period (3-day and 7-day). Actual volume (Vit) is the sum of the 
actual volume observed during the announcement period. Likewise, estimated normal 
volume (EVit) is the sum of the predicted volume over the announcement period using 
estimates from equation 6. Consistent with Cready and Hurtt (2002), abnormal volume 
from the time-series model is the difference between the actual volume and the predicted 
volume standardized by the standard deviation of the residuals from the regression used to 
estimate EV. The representations below are for the three day announcement window.  
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 Where;  
Vid =log of daily trading volume as a percentage of shares 
outstanding for firm i during day d 
MVd =log of daily market trading volume as a percentage of shares 
outstanding for the market on day d 
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Vit= log of actual trading volume as a percentage of shares 
outstanding for firm i during announcement period t 
EVit= log of estimated trading volume as a percentage of shares 
outstanding for firm i during announcement period t 
σit= the standard deviation of the residuals from the market 
regression used to determine EVit 
AV_TSit= the difference between Vit  and  EVit  for firm i during 
announcement period t 
 
 The third abnormal volume metric follows Bamber and Cheon (1995). They 
compute two measures; one measuring fluctuations in the firm’s percentage of shares 
traded, and the other measuring the difference between the firm’s percentage of share 
traded relative to the market’s percentage of shares traded. Tkac (1999) suggests that 
fluctuations in market volume can influence firm trading volume. Therefore, a single 
measure of a firm’s abnormal trading volume should capture the firm’s fluctuations in 
trading volume while controlling for fluctuations in trading volume market-wide. By 
controlling for market-wide fluctuations the firm’s idiosyncratic abnormal trading volume 
can be isolated. Accordingly, I adjust Bamber and Cheon’s (1995) firm specific measure 
by subtracting from it the difference between the market-wide percentage of shares traded 
during the announcement period and the market-wide percentage of share traded during the 
non-announcement period.17 This difference-in-differences approach produces a measure 
of firm abnormal trading volume adjusted for fluctuations in market-wide trading volume. 
I compute the firm’s difference in volume as the difference between the percentage 
of outstanding shares traded during the 3-day (7-day) announcement period and the 
                                                 
17 This is a difference-in-differences approach since I am subtracting the difference in the market-wide 
percentage of shares traded (between announcement period and non-announcement period) from the 
 
  37
average percentage of shares traded during the non-announcement period. The market-
wide difference in volume is the difference between the percentage of outstanding shares 
traded market-wide during the 3-day (7-day) announcement period and the percent of 
shares traded market-wide during the non-announcement period. The difference between 
the firms’ volume difference and the markets’ volume difference are the measures of 
abnormal volume AV03DF (3-day) and AV07DF (7-day). Formally, AV03DF and 
AV07DF are calculated as: 
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 Where; 
AVxxDFi,t = represents 3-day window (AV03DF) and 7-day window (AV07DF) abnormal 
volume for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’. 
AP_TRADEit= sum of trading volume over three (seven) day announcement period for 
firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’. 
AP_OUTit= sum of firm shares outstanding over three (seven) day announcement period 
for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’. 
NA_TRADEit= sum of trading volume for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’ over the non-announcement 
period which begins fifty days prior to the announcement date and ends ten days before the 
announcement date of firm ‘i’. 
NA_OUTit= sum of firm shares outstanding for firm ‘i’ in year ‘t’ over the non-
announcement period which begins fifty days prior to the announcement date and ends ten 
days before the announcement date of firm ‘i’. 
AP_TRADEmarket,t= sum of market-wide trade volume over three (seven) day 
announcement period in year ‘t’. 
 AP_OUTmarket,t= sum of market-wide shares outstanding over three (seven) day 
announcement period in year ‘t’. 
NA_TRADEmarket,t= sum of market-wide trading volume in year ‘t’ over the non-
announcement period which begins 50 days prior to the announcement date and ends ten 
days before the announcement date of firm ‘i’. 
NA_OUTmarket,t= sum of market-wide shares outstanding in year ‘t’ over the non-
announcement period which begins 50 days prior to the announcement date and ends ten 
days before the announcement date of firm ‘i’. 
                                                 
 
difference in the firm’s percentage of shares traded (between announcement period and non-announcement 
period). 
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Control Variables 
Abnormal Returns 
 Many researchers (Abarbanell, 1995; Bamber & Cheon, 1995; Barron, 1995; 
Cready & Hurtt, 2002; Holthausen & Verrecchia, 1990; Karpoff, 1986) have suggested 
that studies designed to detect investor response should include an examination of both 
return-based and trading-based metrics. As the trading volume response is in part related to 
the price response, the inclusion of this control is necessary to isolate the trading volume 
fluctuations attributable to other factors. Consistent with prior research, I include a control 
variable for abnormal returns. Cumulative abnormal returns are computed for both the 
three-day (CAR03) and seven-day (CAR07) event windows.18 Following Bamber et al., 
(1999), the natural log of the absolute value of the computed abnormal return is used in the 
model (LCAR03 and LCAR07).  
Earnings Surprise 
 Abarbanell (1995) suggested that research using dispersion in analysts’ forecasts as 
a proxy for investor disagreement should include a measure for earnings surprise as well as 
other controls. Consistent with Bamber et al. (1997), the control variable for earnings 
surprise is defined as the absolute value of the difference between the mean analysts 
forecast and the actual EPS (before extra items), deflated by the absolute value of the mean 
                                                 
18 CRSP excess returns are only sparsely available for my sample. Therefore, I compute excess returns. 
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forecast (SUR).19 Following Bamber et al., (1999), the log of this variable will be used to 
control for skewness (LSUR). 
Institutional Holding 
 Utama and Cready (1997) and Tkac (1999) examine the differential access to 
information as well as differential capacity for processing that information between 
institutional and non-institutional investors. These studies indicate that the observed 
volume response attendant to an earnings announcement can be expected to be partially 
explained by the differences in institutional holdings across firms. Therefore, I include the 
percent of shares held by institutions as a control variable in my volume models (INST). I 
measure institutional holdings at the close of the last trading day before the announcement 
date. 
Level of Derivative Activity 
 Ahmed et al., (2006) found value-relevance in the magnitude of the net fair-value 
of recognized derivatives (post SFAS 133). However, they found no value-relevance for 
the net fair-value of disclosed derivatives (pre SFAS 133). The interest in the current study 
is to isolate the income effect of the new standard, and, therefore a control for the 
magnitude of derivative activity is necessary. Consistent with the operationalization 
employed by Ahmed et al., (2006), I use the net fair-value of recognized derivatives 
(RFVD) as a control for the magnitude of derivative activity in the post SFAS 133 period 
and the net fair-value of disclosed derivatives (DFVD) as a control in the pre-SFAS 133 
                                                 
19 I also replicate the analysis under a random-walk assumption using earnings in time t as the expectation of 
earnings in time t+1. 
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period. Both RFVD and DFVD are scaled on the number of shares outstanding at the close 
of business the day before the earnings announcement. To allow a direct examination of 
the differential effect between disclosure and recognition on the heterogeneity measures, I 
include both DFVD and RFVD in the model as FVD (fair-value of derivatives) and 
introduce an interaction term (POST) that takes the value of one in the post-SFAS 133 
periods.  
Tests for Hypotheses H1a-b, H2a-b, and H3a-b 
 Hypotheses H1a, H2a, and H3a are examined via univariate analysis and statistical 
tests for differences in means. Hypotheses, H1b, H2b, and H3b claim a relationship 
between the three measures of belief heterogeneity and income measures. These models 
are estimated individually using a cross-sectional panel data set. 
LDISPit = β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCIit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(FVDit) +  
 β6(POST*FVDit) + β7(LSURit) + β8(INSTit) + (FEi) + (YEt) + εit (10) 
 
∆DISPit = β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCIit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(FVDit) +  
 β6(POST*FVDit) + β7(LSURit) + β8(INSTit) + (FEi) + (YEt) + εit (11) 
 
JUMBit = β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCIit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(FVDit) +  
 β6(POST*FVDit) + β7(LSURit) + β8(INSTit) + (FEi) + (YEt) + εit (12) 
 
 
 Where; 
LDISPit = pre-announcement standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts of annual earnings 
divided by the absolute value of the mean forecast for firm i in year t 
∆DISPit = standard deviation of earnings forecasts after earnings announcement less the 
standard deviation of earnings forecasts preceding the earnings announcement. This 
change in the standard deviation is divided by the absolute value of the mean pre-
announcement forecast for firm i in year t 
JUMBit = the complement of the correlation (Spearman) between the relative position of 
individual analysts’ pre and post announcement forecasts for firm i in year t 
DNIit = portion of net income before extraordinary items attributable to SFAS 133, scaled 
by the number of shares outstanding at the close of business the day before the earnings 
announcement for firm i in year t 
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DOCIit = portion of Other Comprehensive Income attributable to SFAS 133, scaled by the 
number of shares outstanding at the close of business the day before the earnings 
announcement for firm i in year t 
NDNIit = portion of net income before extraordinary items not attributable to SFAS 133, 
scaled by the number of shares outstanding at the close of business the day before the 
earnings announcement for firm i in year t 
NDOCIit = portion of Other Comprehensive Income not attributable to SFAS 133, scaled 
by the number of shares outstanding at the close of business the day before the earnings 
announcement for firm i in year t 
FVDit = gross fair value of derivatives (recognized and disclosed) for firm i in year t 
scaled on the market value of equity at the close of business the day before the earnings 
announcement 
POSTit = a binary variable taking on the value of one in the post-SFAS 133 periods, 
otherwise the variable takes the value of zero. 
LSURit = log of the absolute value of the difference between the mean analysts forecast 
and the actual EPS (before extra items), deflated by the absolute value of the mean 
forecast for firm i in year t  
INSTit = percentage of outstanding shares held by institutional investors for firm i in year 
t  
FEi = firm-effect estimator for firm i 
YEt = year-effect estimator for year t 
 
 
 Support for hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b is found when the coefficients on 
DOCI and DNI are significant and positive. A significant and positive coefficient would 
indicate that measures of belief heterogeneity are increasing in the magnitude of income 
effects arising from SFAS 133 (DOCI and DNI). 
Tests for Hypothesis H1c, H2c, and H3c 
 Hypotheses H1c, H2c, and H3c posit that the association between SFAS 133 
reporting and abnormal volume is translated through belief revisions. That is, the new 
reporting (SFAS 133) gives rise to differential beliefs which in turn gives rise to abnormal 
trading volume. It is through the dispersion of beliefs that the new standard affects volume. 
To test this, heterogeneity must be decomposed into the portion attributable to SFAS 133, 
and the portion attributable to other factors. Accordingly, I first compute the portion of the 
three measures of belief heterogeneity attributable to SFAS 133. Using the coefficients for 
  42
DOCI and DNI from equations 10, 11, and 12, I construct variables for a second step 
regression with equations 13, 14, and 15 below. The metrics ∧ DNILDISP it_ , 
∧∆ DNIDISP it_ , 
and  ∧ DNIJUMB it_ each are estimates of the portion of the belief heterogeneity that is 
attributable to the SFAS 133 net income effect.  The metrics ∧ DOCILDISP it_ , 
∧∆ DOCIDISP it_ , 
and  ∧DOCIJUMB it_ each are estimates of the portion of the belief heterogeneity that is 
attributable to the SFAS 133 other comprehensive income effect.  Second, I compute the 
portion of the belief heterogeneity measures not directly associated with SFAS 133 income 
effects by subtracting the total of the SFAS 133 income effects from LDISP, ∆DISP, and 
JUMB, respectively. As shown in equations 16, 17, and 18, these variables are 
denoted ∧ OTHLDISP it_ , 
∧∆ OTHDISP it_ , and 
∧
OTHJUMB it_
, respectively.  
( )DNIDNILDISP itit
∧
=∧ β 1_  (13a) 
( )DOCIDOCILDISP itit
∧
=∧ β 2_  (13b) 
 
( )DNIDNIDISP itit
∧
=∧∆ β 1_  (14a) 
( )DOCIDOCIDISP itit
∧
=∧∆ β 2_  (14a) 
 
( )DNIDNIJUMB itit
∧
=∧ β 1_  (15a) 
( )DOCIDOCIJUMB itit
∧
=∧ β 2_  (15b) 
 
]__[_
∧
+
∧
−=∧ DOCILDISPDNILDISPLDISPOTHLDISP ititit
 (16) 
]__[_
∧
+
∧
−=∧ ∆∆∆∆ DOCIDISPDNIDISPDISPOTHDISP ititit
 (17) 
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]__[_
∧
+
∧
−=∧ DOCIJUMBDNIJUMBJUMBOTHJUMB ititit
 (18) 
 
 The decomposed heterogeneity measures are used in equations 19, 20, and 21. The 
model is then estimated to identify the relationship between heterogeneity induced by 
SFAS 133 and abnormal volume. Each of the models below is estimated separately as a 
cross-sectional regression including firm and year effects.  
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 Where; 
 
AVit represents abnormal volume for firm i in period t and all other measures are as 
previously defined. Equations 19, 20, and 21 are estimated separately using each of the 
three previously defined abnormal volume measures; AV03TS, AV03FE, and AV03DF. 
The 7-day window versions of each of the three measures AV07TS, AV07FE, and 
AV07DF are also estimated. 
 
 One issue that arises in estimating equations 19, 20, and 21 is that the standard 
errors for the estimated belief heterogeneity measures are understated and are inappropriate 
for drawing inferences. According to Pagan (1984), Oxley and McAleer (1993), and 
Murphy and Topel (2002), the standard errors generated from the second step of a two step 
regression with constructed regressors will understate the true standard error. One solution 
is to apply post-hoc adjustments to the variance-covariance matrix to obtain correct 
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standard errors. Another solution, and the one I use, is a bootstrap estimate of the standard 
errors. A more detailed discussion of the understated standard errors and the bootstrap 
approach is provided in the results section. 
 Hypotheses H1c, H2c, and H3c are supported when the coefficients β1 and β2 from 
equations 19, 20 and 21 are positive and significant. In each case, a significant finding 
would indicate that a portion of the abnormal trading volume in the post SFAS 133 period 
is associated with the heterogeneity of beliefs induced by the income effects of SFAS 133. 
Further, this would lend credence to the notion that the recognition of derivative fair-values 
gives rise to abnormal trading volume by altering the belief and belief revisions of 
investors. 
 Results indicate that the income effect (DNI and DOCI) resulting from the fair-
value recognition of hedging derivatives induces differential beliefs among investors. This 
suggests that while fair-value recognition of hedging derivatives has value relevance 
(Ahmed et al., 2006), the income effect of such reporting induces a reduction in the 
consensus of beliefs in the market. That is, a trade-off exists between the value relevance 
of the fair-value recognition of hedging derivatives under SFAS 133 and the degree of 
consensus surrounding earnings under the standard.   
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IV Results 
Sample Size Determination 
 The sample of banks required for the analysis was identified from the Bank 
Regulatory Database which is based on regulatory filings (Call Reports, FR-Y9, etc). From 
this database, a total of 439 banking organizations were identified as utilizing derivatives 
for hedging purposes. Only 101 of these organizations, representing 707 firm-years, also 
had 10-K filings with the SEC during the period 1996 though 2003. Since the income 
effect of SFAS 133 is only available from the 10-K filings, firms not filing with the SEC 
were excluded from the study. 
 Trading volume data for the firms in the sample were obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. Trading volume data were needed for the 
period between 50 days prior to five days after the earnings announcement dates for each 
firm for the period 1996 - 2003. A total of 208 firm-years were lost from my sample due to 
an insufficient number of trading volume observations during the non-announcement 
period. 
 Measures of belief heterogeneity were computed from analysts’ forecasts issued 
within 30 days prior to the earnings announcement date and 45 days following the earnings 
announcement date. The prior dispersion (LDISP) and change in dispersion (∆DISP) 
heterogeneity measures rely on the standard deviation in analysts forecasts. The ∆DISP 
measure requires the standard deviation in analysts’ forecasts both before and after the 
announcement date. For consistency I only include the forecasts for analysts that are 
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present both before and after the announcement. In computing LDISP I use only forecasts 
from analysts that are retained for the ∆DISP computation. As a result, a total of 276 firm-
year observations were lost. The analyses dealing with prior dispersion (LDISP) and 
change in dispersion (∆DISP), therefore, are restricted to 51 firms representing 223 firm-
year observations. The third heterogeneity measure is based on the non-parametric 
correlation of analysts’ rank ordered earnings forecast before and after the earnings 
announcement. Computation of this measure where only two analysts are present produces 
a correlation of 1 or -1. Therefore, I omit firm-years with less than three analysts providing 
forecasts before and after the announcement date. An additional 14 firms and 131 firm 
years are lost. The remaining sample for the analyses related to jumbling (JUMB) is 
restricted to 37 firms with 92 firm-years. Determination of sample just described is 
summarized as Table 1.  
Data Set Description and Univariate Statistics 
 Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the firm-year observations included in 
the study. Panel A shows the summary statistics for the entire sample (N=223) in the study.  
Panel B shows the summary statistics for the firm-year observations before adoption of 
SFAS 133. In Panel B, derivative NI, derivative OCI, and derivative incomes are not 
reported since derivative income measures were not available prior to the adoption of 
SFAS 133. Panel C shows the summary statistics for the firm year observations after the 
adoption of SFAS 133.  Overall, the table shows the consistency of the total sample with 
the pre and post SFAS 133 sub-samples.  
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TABLE 1 
Sample Determination 
 
This table provides a summary of how the final sample was determined.  
 
  Number 
of Firms 
Number of 
Firm-Years  
   
Firms Identified as using Derivatives on the  
Bank Regulatory Database 
439  
   
Initial Sample from SEC 10-K Collection 101 707 
    
 Loss due to missing volume data  (208) 
 Loss due to insufficient analyst following  (276) 
   
Sample used in analysis of LDISP and ∆DISP 51 223 
    
 Observations having less than 3 analysts 
following 
 (131) 
   
Sample used in analysis of JUMB 37 92 
   
Firms were originally identified as using derivatives for hedging purposes 
for the period 1996 through 2003 based on reporting in the Bank Regulatory 
Database (form FY-9). Of these institutions, only 101 also filed 10-K with 
the SEC. These 101 firms represented 707 firm-years of data. Due to 
missing information necessary for the analyses, a total of 51 firms 
representing 223 firm-years are used in examinations of LDISP and ∆DISP. 
Further reduction in sample size is necessary to obtain reasonable estimates 
of JUMB. Therefore, a total of 37 firms, representing 92 firm-years, are used 
in examinations of JUMB.  
 
 
 The gross fair-value of derivatives reported in Table 2 shows the sum of the 
absolute value of all hedging derivative positions (asset or liability) for the firm. Panel A 
shows that the gross fair-value of derivatives for the total sample ranges from $0.01 
million to 28.43 million with an average of $1.15 million. Panel B shows that in the pre-
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SFAS 133 period the gross fair value of hedging derivatives ranges from 0.09 to 28.43 
million with an average of 1.55 million.  In the post SFAS 133 period (Panel C) the gross 
fair value of hedging derivatives ranges from 0.01 to 8.34 million with an average of 0.83. 
This represents a slight reduction in the nominal values of gross derivative positions, and 
may reflect a more careful application of derivative instruments after SFAS 133 was 
introduced. 
 Derivative net income and derivative other comprehensive income are also reported 
in Table 2. Since derivative income is only reported after the adoption of SFAS 133, the 
derivative income statistics reported in Panel A are identical to those reported in Panel C. 
Panel C shows that the derivative net income ranges from a loss of $2.5 million to profit of 
$0.9 million with the average being a loss of $14.6 thousand. Derivative other 
comprehensive income ranges from a negative equity adjustment of $472.0 thousand to a 
positive equity adjustment of $930.0 thousand with an average of $10.13 thousand. Panel 
C of Table 2 also reports the total of derivative incomes (net income and other 
comprehensive income) as a percent of total incomes (net income and other comprehensive 
income). This ratio ranges from negative 2.6 percent to positive 2.3 percent. 
 Table 3 reports the descriptive statistics of the variables in the study. All income 
measures used are shown as dollars per share. Income measures (DNI, NDNI, DOCI, 
NDOCI) exhibiting extreme values are winsorized at the 99 and 1 percent levels rather 
than dropped from the sample. Of the three abnormal volume measures, only the fixed-
effect estimated abnormal volume (AV03FE and AV07FE) and the difference-in-
differences estimated abnormal volume (AV03DF and AV07DF) can be expressed as 
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percentages. Both of these measures express abnormal volume as a percent of outstanding 
shares traded. The time-series estimated volume measures (AV03TS and AV07TS) are 
scalars that do not directly represent a volume level or a volume percentage. Rather, the 
time-series estimates can only be used to indicate relative size of the estimated abnormal 
volume. Consistent with prior literature, the positive average abnormal returns (CAR03 
and CAR07) and positive average abnormal volume statistics (AV03FE, AV07FE, 
AV03DF, and AV07DF) surrounding earnings announcements indicate that investors do 
react to earnings announcements both in terms of equity prices and in trade activity. 
 The heterogeneity measures are computed consistent with Bamber et al., (1997). 
The Bamber et al., (1997) study covers the 10 year period from 1984 through 1994, and is 
not restricted by industry. They report mean and median values for prior dispersion of 
0.127 and 0.063, respectively with a standard deviation 0.297. Table 3 shows that prior 
dispersion in this study has a mean of 0.0462, a median of 0.0079, and a standard deviation 
of 0.122. Change in dispersion is reported by Bamber et al., (1997) with a mean of -0.006, 
a median of -0.015, and a standard deviation of 0.163. Table 3 reports a mean for change in 
dispersion of -0.0009, a median of 0.0081, and a standard deviation of 0.0968. Bamber et 
al., (1997) also report the Spearman correlation between the rank ordered analysts forecast 
before and the rank ordered analysts for each after earnings announcement. This is the base 
number used in computing JUMB. They report a mean of 0.477, a median of 0.589, and a 
standard deviation of 0.415. Table 3 reports the same statistic (CORR) for this study and 
shows a mean of 0.3652 a median of 0.5867, and a standard deviation of 0.6959. The 
differences between the heterogeneity measures reported in Table 3 and those reported by 
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Bamber et al.,(1997) is likely attributable to this study’s focus on regulated banking 
organizations. Due to the U.S. regulatory environment, banking organizations receive 
greater scrutiny and bear a heavier reporting burden than many other industries. As a 
result, it seems reasonable to expect that the banking industry would also experience lower 
divergences in investor opinion than the broader market. This is the case when comparing 
prior dispersion and change in dispersion with the Bamber et al., (1997) study. 
 Pairwise correlations for variables in the study are included as Table 4. Correlations 
over 0.25 and /or significant at the p<.001 level are discussed. Derivative other 
comprehensive income (DOCI) is negatively correlated (-0.564) with non-derivative other 
comprehensive income (NDOCI). This reflects the recording of cash flow hedge effects in 
other comprehensive income along with changes in the hedged item being recorded in 
other comprehensive income. Only the cash flow hedge portion is classified by SFAS 133 
as a derivative income effect. As such, an increase in cash-flow hedge fair-value (DOCI) is 
negatively related to decreases in the hedged items (NDOCI).  
 Heterogeneity measures prior dispersion (LDISP) and change in dispersion 
(∆DISP) show a correlation of -0.444 which is significant at the p<.001 level. Since the 
∆DISP is reporting the change in the post announcement period dispersion relative to the 
preannouncement level of dispersion, the negative correlation indicates that the reduction 
in dispersion associated with the earnings announcement increases as the pre-
announcement level of dispersion increases. That is, as prior dispersion increases, the 
greater the convergence (∆DISP) of opinion based on the earnings announcement.  
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 Correlations among all six abnormal volume measures are positive, relatively large, 
and significant at the p<.001 level. This is confirmatory that the six abnormal trading 
volume measures reflect the same underlying phenomenon. The same is true for the two 
measures of abnormal returns, which show a positive correlation coefficient of .333 and is 
significant at the p<.001 level. 
 Earnings surprise (LSUR) is positively correlated with prior dispersion (LDISP) 
and negatively associated with change in dispersion (∆DISP). Prior uncertainty about a 
forthcoming earnings report is likely to generate larger dispersion in analysts forecasts 
(LDISP) and can be expected to manifest in a large error in earnings forecast (LSUR). 
Additionally, a larger earnings surprise induces a decrease in the dispersion in analyst’s 
revised forecasts (i.e. ∆DISP). This reflects the new information provided to the market 
when the earnings surprise (LSUR) increases. A larger surprise indicates a greater degree 
of newly released information. To the extent that the new information is interpreted 
commonly by individuals, the dispersion in forecasts can be expected to decrease after an 
earnings announcement containing the new information. This gives rise to the negative and 
significant correlation between ∆DISP and LSUR. 
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TABLE 2 
 
This table reports broad financial measures for the firms included in the sample. Panel A reports the measures for all firm-
years included in the sample. Panel B and Panel C report the same measures for the firm-years prior to the adoption of SFAS 
133 and after the adoption of SFAS 133, respectively.  
  
Descriptive Statistics for Sample Firms – Full Sample 
 
PANEL A: Full Sample (N=223 firm-years)  Mean   Median   Min   Max  
 Total Assets ($ thousands)     115,211.40      38,564.59       1,394.36 1,264,032.00 
 Market Value of Equity ($ millions)       21,600.00        9,184.66           156.32   260,000.00 
 FV of Derivatives - gross ($ millions)              1.15           0.74              0.01              28.43 
 FV of Derivatives - net ($ millions)                0.34               0.08              (0.96)             11.52 
 Net Income($ thousands)         1,363.14           486.30           (511.00)      17,853.00 
 Other Comprehensive Income ($ thousands)           (6.53)             2.76        (3,365.00)         1,912.00 
 Derivative NI ($ thousands) (14.64) 0.00 (2,464.00) 985.22 
 Derivative OCI ($ thousands) 10.13  0.00 (472.00) 930.00 
 Derivative incomes / Total Incomes 0.001% 0.003% -2.689% 2.337%
 FV of Derivatives (gross) / Total Assets 0.002% 0.002% 0.001% 0.049%
 FV of Derivatives (net) / Total Assets 0.001% -0.001% -0.001% 0.020%
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TABLE 2 (cont) 
Descriptive Statistics for Firms in Sample – Before adoption and after adoption of SFAS 133 
     
PANEL B: Pre-SFAS 133 (N=124 firm-years)  Mean   Median   Min   Max  
 Total Assets ($ thousands)     141,833.50      30,859.13         1,394.36 1,264,032.00 
 Market Value of Equity ($ millions)       25,700.00       9,060.28            175.04    260,000.00 
 FV of Derivatives - gross ($ millions)    1.55          0.40 0.09       28.43 
 FV of Derivatives - net ($ millions)                0.58              0.05              (0.35)              11.52 
 Net Income($ thousands)         1,679.17           441.73            (41.42)   17,853.00 
 Other Comprehensive Income ($ thousands)              (0.23)              2.05        (3,365.00)       1,698.00 
 Derivative NI ($ thousands) 
 Derivative OCI ($ thousands) 
 Derivative incomes / Total Incomes 
Not Reported Prior to SFAS 133 Adoption 
 FV of Derivatives (gross) / Total Assets 0.002% 0.000% 0.000% 0.048%
 FV of Derivatives (net) / Total Assets 0.001% 0.000% -0.003% 0.020%
 
PANEL C: Post-SFAS 133 (N=99 firm-years) Mean Median Min Max 
 Total Assets ($ thousands)       88,589.31      45,447.95        1,534.38   716,937.00 
 Market Value of Equity ($ millions)       17,600.00      10,200.00           156.32  188,000.00 
 FV of Derivatives - gross ($ millions)         0.83           0.64               0.01              8.34 
 FV of Derivatives - net ($ millions)                0.14               0.23               (0.96)              1.27 
 Net Income($ thousands)         1,120.92           601.00           (511.00)      13,519.00 
 Other Comprehensive Income ($ thousands)            (11.59)              9.50        (2,810.00)         1,912.00 
 Derivative NI ($ thousands) (14.64) 0.00 (2,464.00) 985.22 
 Derivative OCI ($ thousands) 10.13  0.00 (472.00) 930.00 
 Derivative incomes / Total Incomes 0.001% 0.003% -2.689% 2.337%
 FV of Derivatives (gross) / Total Assets 0.002% 0.001% 0.000% 0.040%
 FV of Derivatives (net) / Total Assets 0.000% 0.000% -0.001% 0.014%
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TABLE 3 
Descriptive Statistics for Income Measures and Abnormal Trading Volume (N=223 firm-years) 
Measure Description1 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Income Measures      
DNI Derivative NI ($ per share) 0.0296 0.0000 0.1869 -0.6077 1.7344
DOCI Derivative OCI ($ per share) 0.0471 0.0000 0.4800 -2.4797 3.7000
NDNI Non-Derivative NI ($ per share) 2.5124 2.3660 1.3245 -4.4007 5.2600
NDOCI Non-Derivative OCI ($ per share) -0.0352 0.0124 0.7060 -3.4500 2.6979
       
Abnormal Trading Volume Measures      
AV03TS 3-day – Time Series model 1.3582 0.9357 3.6695 -6.4611 19.6792
AV03FE 3-day – Firm Effect model 0.255% -0.043% 1.038% -0.814% 6.535%
AV03DF 3-day – Difference model 0.037% -0.012% 0.254% -0.427% 1.854%
AV07TS 7-day – Time Series model 2.4042 2.3106 6.7015 -11.9265 32.3281
AV07FE 7-day – Firm Effect model 0.432% -0.045% 1.979% -2.002% 12.211%
AV07DF 7-day – Difference model 0.015% -0.019% 0.184% -0.660% 0.999%
 
Note 1: See Appendix A for computation and full description of variables 
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TABLE 3 (cont.) 
Descriptive Statistics for Heterogeneity Measures and Control Variables (N=223 firm-years) 
Measure Description1 Mean Median 
Standard 
Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Heterogeneity Measures      
DISP* Dispersion 0.0462 0.0079 0.1222 0.0013 0.7600
LDISP Natural log of DISP -4.4645 -4.8368 1.3981 -6.6765 -0.2744
∆DISP Change in dispersion -0.0009 0.0081 0.0968 -0.6800 0.1970
CORR* Correlation between pre- and post-
announcement analyst forecast rank order 0.3652 0.5867 0.6959 -1.0000 1.0000
JUMB Natural log of (1.1-CORR) -0.9007 -0.6673 1.1844 -2.3026 0.7419
       
Control Variables      
SURP* Earnings Surprise (dollars per share) -0.0063 0.0026 0.1660 -0.9300 0.8200
LSUR Natural log of Earning Surprise -4.3982 -4.6995 1.5937 -8.2177 -0.0726
INST Institutional Holdings (% of shares out) 0.4084 0.4634 0.2419 0.0000 0.9247
FVD Fair Value of Hedge Derivatives ($ per share) 1.1535 0.5236 2.3644 0.0001 8.3448
CAR03* Cumulative 3-day abnormal return (percent) 0.0030 0.0045 0.0373 -0.2281 0.1231
LCAR03 Natural log of the absolute value of CAR03 -4.0722 -3.9073 1.1041 -8.3653 -1.4782
CAR07* Cumulative 7-day abnormal return (percent) 0.0052 0.0051 0.0467 -0.1440 0.1313
LCAR07 Natural log of the absolute value of CAR07 -3.7697 -3.5407 1.1501 -8.6337 -1.9377
   
Note 1: See Appendix A for computation and full description of variables 
Note 2: * This form of the variable is not used in the analysis but is shown as a point of comparison to prior literature 
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TABLE 4 
Pearson Correlations 
 
 DNI DOCI NDNI NDOCI LDISP ∆DISP JUMBLE FVD LNSR 
DNI 1.000         
DOCI -0.069 1.000        
NDNI -0.037 0.156* 1.000       
NDOCI 0.046 -0.564*** -0.119 1.000      
LDISP -0.036 0.015 -0.067 0.026 1.000     
∆DISP 0.072 0.028 0.076 -0.026 -0.444*** 1.000    
JUMB -0.072 0.047 0.065 0.022 0.047 -0.105 1.000   
FVD 0.186** 0.153* 0.400*** -0.107 0.048 0.024 0.159 1.000  
LSUR -0.087 -0.028 -0.072 0.085 0.730*** -0.361*** 0.086 0.009 1.000 
INST 0.153* 0.152* 0.089 -0.041 -0.292*** 0.040 0.079 0.142* -0.221*** 
AV03TS 0.082 0.136* 0.145* -0.109 -0.109 0.124 0.132 0.144* -0.008 
AV03FE 0.168* 0.375*** 0.174** -0.308*** -0.048 0.086 0.138 0.119 -0.009 
AV03DF 0.181** 0.270*** 0.186** -0.203** -0.020 0.110 0.155 0.176** 0.002 
AV07TS 0.000 0.083 0.126 -0.084 -0.057 0.098 0.137 0.062 0.048 
AV07FE 0.091 0.376*** 0.159* -0.335*** -0.030 0.066 0.132 0.064 0.012 
AV07DF 0.072 0.230*** 0.171* -0.186** 0.016 0.095 0.158 0.125 0.044 
LCAR03 0.018 0.082 -0.122 -0.044 0.080 0.068 0.038 -0.057 0.039 
LCAR07 0.044 0.061 -0.054 -0.099 0.158* -0.045 0.025 -0.024 0.188** 
          
Note 1: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .05, .01, and .001 levels, respectively 
Note 2: All variables are as defined in Appendix A 
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TABLE 4 (cont.) 
Pearson Correlations 
 
 INST AV03TS AV03FE AV03DF AV07TS AV07FE AV07DF LCAR03 LCAR07
DNI          
DOCI          
NDNI          
NDOCI          
LDISP          
∆DISP          
JUMB          
FVD          
LSUR          
INST 1.000         
AV03TS 0.156* 1.000        
AV03FE 0.193** 0.593*** 1.000       
AV03DF 0.148* 0.797*** 0.843*** 1.000      
AV07TS 0.166* 0.862*** 0.472*** 0.665*** 1.000     
AV07FE 0.184** 0.423*** 0.909*** 0.672*** 0.472*** 1.000    
AV07DF 0.118 0.650*** 0.668*** 0.833*** 0.761*** 0.724*** 1.000   
LCAR03 0.010 0.172* 0.143* 0.180** 0.160* 0.108* 0.145* 1.000  
LCAR07 0.041 0.039 0.179** 0.110 0.101 0.218** 0.142* 0.333*** 1.000 
          
Note 1: *, **, and *** indicate significance at the .05, .01, and .001 levels, respectively 
Note 2: All variables are as defined in Appendix A 
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 Institutional holding (INST) is negatively associated with prior dispersion (LDISP). 
Higher levels of institutional holdings are associated with lower levels of prior dispersion 
in analysts’ forecasts and likely reflect the nature of firms where institutional investors 
invest. These firms may be of an established nature, probably larger, and have a more 
stable income stream that those firms avoided by institutional investors. A more steady 
income stream would manifest as a smaller dispersion in analysts’ forecasts since the 
reduced earnings variability makes the earnings prediction more straight forward. 
 The positive association between non-derivative net income (NDNI) and fair value 
of derivatives (FVD) is most likely indicative of a size-effect. As NDNI increases the 
tendency for a financial firm to employ derivatives to hedge that income also increases. 
Both of the other comprehensive income measures (DOCI and NDOCI) are significantly 
correlated with the fixed-effect (AV03FE, AV07FE) and difference-in-differences 
(AV03DF, AV07DF) abnormal volume estimates. Abnormal volume is negatively 
correlated with NDOCI, indicating that higher levels of non-derivative other 
comprehensive income results in lower disaggregated beliefs in the market. Conversely, 
abnormal volume moves in the same direction as DOCI, indicating that the derivative 
related portion of other comprehensive income increases disaggregated beliefs. A more 
complete listing of the variables employed in the analyses and the method used to compute 
each is included as Appendix A. 
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Preliminary Examination 
 Broadly, my hypotheses are designed to test for the relationship between income 
effects of SFAS 133 and belief heterogeneity. While no specific hypothesis is posited for 
the overall relationship between abnormal volume and SFAS 133 income measures, I 
examine this overall effect. To isolate the effect of derivative income on abnormal volume, 
I control for earnings surprise (LSUR), abnormal returns (LCAR03 / LCAR07), and firm 
effects. The results of this preliminary examination are reported in Table 5. Panel A reports 
the results of the model using 3-day window abnormal volume measures as the dependent 
variable. Panel B reports the results of the same regressions with the 7-day abnormal 
volume windows as the dependent variable. 
 In Panel A, the AV03TS model shows a model significance at p<.01 with an 
R2(within) of 6.18 percent. The ‘within’ R2 is reported since I apply the within 
transformation blocked on firm. Therefore, the relevant measure of explained variance is 
the amount of variation within groups (firms) that is explained by the model. Derivative 
net income (DNI) shows a positive coefficient of 1.9034 which is significant at the p<.10 
level. The AV03TS measure is a scalar that does not directly represent a volume level or a 
volume percentage. Rather it indicates relative size of the estimated abnormal volume 
alone. Therefore, a one dollar per-share increase in DNI translates to a 1.9034 unit increase 
in the AV03TS measure of abnormal volume. Derivative other comprehensive income 
(DOCI) has a positive but non-significant coefficient. Non-derivative net income (NDNI) 
is also positively associated with changes in AV03TS and significant at the p<.01 level. As 
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expected, LSUR and LCAR03 both have positive coefficients. The coefficient on LCAR03 
is significant at the p<.05 level 
 Also in Panel A, the AV03FE model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 
approximately 12 percent of the variation in the abnormal volume measure. AV03FE is a 
measure of abnormal volume expressed as a percent of shares outstanding. DNI shows a 
positive coefficient significant at the p<.01 level. A one dollar per share increase in DNI is 
positively associated with a 1.11 percent increase in the percent of shares traded. DOCI 
also shows a positive coefficient estimate, however, it is non-significant. NDNI is positive 
and significant (p<.01). NDOCI is also significant (p<.01), but with a negative coefficient. 
LSUR and LCAR03 both have positive coefficient estimates and are significant at the p<.1 
and p<.01 levels, respectively. 
 Finally, Panel A also shows the results of the AV03DF model. This model is 
significant at the p<.01 level and explains 9.96 percent of the variation in the abnormal 
volume measure. DNI is significant at the p<.01 level and indicates that a one dollar per 
share increase in DNI is associated with an increase of 0.30 percent increase in trading 
volume. In this model DOCI is significant at the p<.05 level and indicates a one dollar 
increase in DOCI per share is associated with at 0.09 percent increase in trading volume. 
As in the previous models NDNI is also positive and significant at the p<.01 level. Both 
LSUR and LCAR03 have positive coefficients, but only LCAR03 is significant (p<.01).  
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TABLE 5 
Relationship Between Derivative Income and 3-Day Abnormal Trading Volume 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and their respective p-values for the 
regression of each 3-day announcement window abnormal volume on SFAS 133 related 
income measures, controlling for earnings surprise, 3-day abnormal returns, and firm 
effects. Variable definitions and computations are reported in Appendix A.  
 
AVit= β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(LSURit) + β6(LCAR03it) + FEi  + εit 
 
PANEL A 
 AV03TS AV03FE AV03DF 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Est. 
Coef. 
p-value 
Constant ? 2.7181 0.075* 0.0060 0.044** 0.0013 0.220 
DNI + 1.9034 0.094* 0.0111 0.005*** 0.0030 0.001*** 
DOCI + 0.5953 0.134 0.0033 0.184 0.0009 0.037** 
NDNI ? 0.4646 0.001*** 0.0013 0.027** 0.0004 0.008*** 
NDOCI ? -0.2303 0.499 -0.0017 0.006*** -0.0003 0.179 
LSUR + 0.0234 0.875 0.0007 0.078** 0.0001 0.309 
LCAR03 + 0.6062 0.011** 0.0010 0.010** 0.0004 0.007*** 
Firm Effects  Included Included Included 
      
N  223 223  223
Groups  51 51  51
Wald-sig  0.0000 0.0066  0.0000
Wald-stat  61.95 17.87  32.22
R2(within)  0.0618 0.1203  0.0996
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 5 (cont.) 
Relationship between Derivative Income and 7-Day Abnormal Trading Volume 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and their respective p-values for the 
regression of each 7-day announcement window abnormal volume on SFAS 133 related 
income measures, controlling for earnings surprise, 7-day abnormal returns, and firm 
effects. Variable definitions and computations are reported in Appendix A. 
 
AVit= β0 + β1(DNIit) + β2(DOCit) + β3(NDNIit) + β4(NDOCIit) + β5(LSURit) + β6(LCAR07it) + FEi  + εit  
 
PANEL B 
  AV07TS AV07FE AV07DF 
Variable Exp.
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Est. 
Coef. 
p-value 
Constant ? 3.5900 0.100 0.0111 0.003 0.0005 0.397 
DNI + 0.3228 0.842 0.0129 0.019** 0.0010 0.026** 
DOCI + 0.4750 0.588 0.0042 0.380 0.0005 0.221 
NDNI ? 0.6808 0.029** 0.0025 0.016** 0.0003 0.018** 
NDOCI ? -0.4314 0.496 -0.0031 0.009*** -0.0002 0.200 
LSUR + 0.1946 0.467 0.0011 0.059* 0.0001 0.212 
LCAR07 + 0.5627 0.156 0.0025 0.000*** 0.0002 0.038** 
Firm Effects  Included Included Included 
      
N  223 223  223
Groups  51 51  51
Wald-sig  0.0007 0.0000  0.0013
Wald-stat  23.40 39.39  21.90
R2(within)  0.0361 0.1273  0.0581
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively.
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 Prior literature shows that the full effect of abnormal trading volume extends up to 
5 days following earnings announcements (Morse, 1980).  Therefore, in addition to the 3-
day window, I also test the derivative income effect against similarly computed 7-day 
abnormal volume measures. Panel B of Table 5 reports the results of these models. The 
model using AV07TS as the dependent variable is significant at the p<.01 level and 
explains 3.61 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. The two variables of 
interest both show positive coefficient estimates, however, neither is significant. The 
model for the 7-day window of the fixed effect abnormal volume estimate (AV07FE) is 
significant at the p<.01 level and explains 12.73 percent of the variation in the dependent 
variable. DNI has a positive estimate coefficient of 0.0129 and is significant at the p<.05 
level. A one dollar change in per share DNI is associated with an increase in abnormal 
trading volume equal to 1.29 percent of shares outstanding. The estimated coefficient for 
DOCI is also positive, but non-significant. The third model in Panel B reports the 
regression results for the 7-day difference in differences abnormal volume estimate 
(AV07DF). This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 5.81 percent of the 
variation in the AV07DF measure of abnormal trading volume. DNI has a significant 
(p<.05) coefficient of 0.10 percent. A one dollar increase in per share DNI is positively 
associated with a 0.10 percent increase in trading volume. DOCI also has a positive 
estimated coefficient, but is non-significant. 
 The results in Table 5 support my overall hypothesis that SFAS 133 income effects 
have a positive and significant associate with abnormal volume. SFAS 133 related net 
income is significant in all but one of the six models. Other comprehensive income arising 
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from SFAS 133 has a positive estimated coefficient in all models, but is significant only in 
the AV03DF model. Net income arising from SFAS 133 is positively related to 
heterogeneous beliefs measured by abnormal volume. 
Results for Hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a 
 The first set of hypotheses (H1a, H2a, and H3a) call for the univariate test of 
differences between the pre-adoption and post-adoption levels of prior dispersion (LDISP), 
change in dispersion (∆DISP), and jumbling (JUMB), respectively. I employ both the 
difference in means t-test and the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney median difference tests. 
Results for these tests on LDISP, ∆DISP, and JUMB are shown in Panel A of Table 6. The 
test of means for LDISP shows a significant (p<.01) difference between pre-adoption and 
post-adoption, however, in the reverse direction of my hypothesis. This indicates that prior 
dispersion had decreased in the period following the adoption of SFAS-133. The test of 
medians confirms the decline in LDISP and is significant at the p<.1 level20. The results 
are contrary to hypothesis H1a, and indicate that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts is 
smaller in the post-SFAS 133 adoption period than before. Several factors may be masking 
the univariate difference hypothesized. For example, the adoption of Regulation FD in 
2000 may have made the informational landscape significantly more homogeneous, 
decreasing the information asymmetries that can give rise to dispersion in earnings 
forecasts. 
                                                 
20 All formally stated hypotheses in this study are directional. While this permits usage of single-tailed tests, 
to be conservative, all tables throughout the study report significance levels for a two-tailed test.  
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TABLE 6 
Pre- and Post-Adoption Differences in Belief Heterogeneity  
Hypotheses H1a, H2a, H3a 
 
This table reports the difference in mean and difference in median 
tests applied to the three measures of heterogeneity. Panel A shows 
the results using the pre-adoption years of 1996-2000 and the post-
adoption years of 2001-2003. Panel B shows the results using the 
pre-adoption years of 1999-2000 and the post adoption years of 
2002-2003. 
 
PANEL A: Pre=1996-2000; Post=2001-2003 
 
  Pre-133 Post-133 Diff. p-value 
LDISP  N  124 99  
 Mean  -4.202 -4.736 -0.534 0.004*** 
 Median -4.643 -4.895 -0.252 0.068* 
∆DISP  N  124 99  
 Mean  -0.005 0.001 0.006 0.657 
 Median 0.006 0.012 0.006 0.094* 
JUMB  N  45 47  
 Mean  -0.642 -0.566 0.076 0.695 
 Median -0.476 -0.357 0.119 0.404 
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
      
PANEL B: Pre=1999-2000; Post=2002-2003 
 
   Pre-133  Post-133  Diff.. p-value 
LDISP  N  57 64   
 Mean  -4.399 -4.931 -0.532 0.024** 
 Median -4.811 -5.073 -0.262 0.415 
∆DISP  N  57 64   
 Mean  -0.016 0.013 0.029 0.089* 
 Median 0.007 0.013 0.006 0.083* 
JUMB  N  23 31   
 Mean  -0.629 -0.599 0.03 0.906 
 Median -0.435 -0.357 0.078 0.752 
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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 Also in Panel A of Table 6, I test for a difference in means of ∆DISP. While the 
computed means for ∆DISP is larger in the post period, the change is non-significant. 
Results for the median test also show an increase in ∆DISP following SFAS-133 adoption. 
This result is significant at the p<.1 level. This result supports hypothesis H2a, and 
indicates that the dispersion in analysts’ forecasts expanded in response to earnings 
announcements in the post SFAS 133 adoption period. 
 While Jumbling shows a positive difference for both mean and median in the 
period following SFAS-133 adoption, neither result is significant. As with LDISP, this 
may reflect other factors inducing jumbling before the SFAS 133 adoption.  
 In addition to examining the differences across the entire time horizon, I conduct 
the same differences in mean and differences in median tests between the two years 
preceding SFAS 133 adoption and two years following adoption. The year of adoption is 
excluded. By testing only the two years preceding (1999-2000) and the two years after 
(2002-2003) adoption, I attempt to minimize other factors that may be masking the 
hypothesized difference. Since all firms in the sample transitioned in 2001, I also drop the 
transition year to isolate the effects of adopting a new standard. These results are shown in 
Panel B of Table 3. Prior dispersion (LDISP) shows a significant difference between the 
two periods, however, the result is counter to my hypothesis. The median test for LDISP is 
non-significant. Both the mean and median tests for ∆DISP are positive and significant, 
providing support for hypothesis H2a. As before, both tests for JUMB, while providing a 
result consistent with my hypothesis, are not significant. Overall, I find support only for 
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hypothesis H2a. The change in dispersion surrounding earnings announcements after the 
adoption of SFAS 133 shows an increase in heterogeneity as measured by ∆DISP. 
Supplemental analysis: 
 As a final step in examining the expectation of expanded belief heterogeneity after 
SFAS 133 adoption, I test for differences between the pre-adoption and post-adoption 
abnormal volume measures with both the mean and median tests. Table 7 reports the 
results for the mean and median tests over the entire study period (1996-2003). Table 8 
reports the results for the mean and median tests including only the two years prior (1999 
& 2000) and the two years after the adoption year (2002 & 2003). Both the mean and 
median difference tests across all abnormal volume measures show positive and significant 
differences. While I have no specific hypothesis for the univariate analysis of abnormal 
volume, the results are consistent with the underlying expectation of larger heterogeneity 
subsequent tot the adoption of SFAS 133. Abnormal volume appears to be reflecting some 
aspect of belief heterogeneity not captured by the three measure proposed by Bamber et al., 
(1999). As the LDISP, ∆DISP, and JUMB measures are computed from analysts forecasts, 
the stronger relationship found in abnormal volume may be attributed to that measure 
capturing aspects of heterogeneity general to the market but not shared by analysts. 
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Table 7 
Pre- and Post-133 Differences in Abnormal Volume 
(full sample) 
Pre=1996-2000; Post=2001-2003 
 
This table reports the difference in mean and difference in median tests 
applied to the three measures of abnormal volume over the entire sample 
period. Panel A shows the results for the 3-day announcement window. 
Panel B shows the results for the 7-day announcement window. Pre-133 
includes the years 1996-2000 and Post-133 includes the years 2001-
2003. 
 
PANEL A: 3-Day Window 
   Pre-133 Post-133 Difference p-value 
  N  124 99   
 AV03TS  Mean 0.386 2.666 2.28 0.000*** 
  Median 0.319 2.303 1.985 0.000*** 
 AV03FE  Mean 0.03% 0.44% 0.41% 0.003*** 
  Median -0.16% 0.06% 0.22% 0.013*** 
 AV03DF  Mean -0.02% 0.10% 0.12% 0.001*** 
  Median -0.04% 0.03% 0.06% 0.000*** 
 *, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
 
PANEL B: 7-Day Window 
   Pre-133 Post-133 Difference p-value 
  N  124 99   
 AV07TS  Mean 0.661 4.558 3.897 0.000*** 
  Median 0.489 3.467 2.979 0.001*** 
 AV07FE  Mean 0.04% 0.65% 0.61% 0.013*** 
  Median -0.29% 0.10% 0.39% 0.013*** 
 AV07DF  Mean -0.02% 0.05% 0.07% 0.002*** 
  Median -0.04% 0.02% 0.06% 0.000*** 
 *, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Pre- and Post-133 Differences in Abnormal Volume 
(restricted sample) 
Pre=1999-2000; Post=2002-2003 
 
This table reports the difference in mean and difference in median tests 
applied to the three measures of abnormal volume for the two years 
immediately preceding adoption and the two years following the adoption 
year. Panel A shows the results for the 3-day announcement window. 
Panel B shows the results for the 7-day announcement window. Pre-133 
includes the years 1999-2000 and Post-133 includes the years 2002-2003. 
 
PANEL A: 3-Day Window 
   Pre-133 Post-133 Difference p-value 
  N  57 64   
 AV03TS  Mean 0.545 3.041 2.495 0.000*** 
  Median 0.635 2.78 2.145 0.036** 
 AV03FE  Mean 0.12% 0.64% 0.52% 0.008*** 
  Median -0.04% 0.10% 0.13% 0.520 
 AV03DF  Mean -0.04% 0.13% 0.16% 0.001*** 
  Median -0.03% 0.01% 0.04% 0.083* 
 *, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
 
PANEL B: 7-Day Window 
   Pre-133 Post-133 Difference p-value 
  N  57 64   
 AV07TS  Mean 0.916 5.348 4.432 0.000*** 
  Median 1.509 3.7 2.191 0.083* 
 AV07FE  Mean 0.27% 0.99% 0.72% 0.044** 
  Median -0.06% 0.25% 0.32% 0.055* 
 AV07DF  Mean -0.04% 0.06% 0.10% 0.004*** 
  Median -0.04% 0.01% 0.05% 0.022** 
 *, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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Results for Hypothesis H1b, H2b, H3b 
 The second set of hypotheses (H1b, H2b, H3b) address the expected association 
between the SFAS 133 income effect (DNI and DOCI) and the three measures of belief 
heterogeneity (LDISP, ∆DISP, JUMB). The results for these tests are found in Table 9. 
The model relating LDISP to DNI and DOCI is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 
45.52 percent of the variation in LDISP within firms. Consistent with my hypothesis, the 
estimated coefficient for DNI is positive and significant at the p<.10 level. A one dollar per 
share increase in DNI is positively associated with a 46.22 percent change in the dispersion 
of analysts’ forecasts prior to earnings announcement.21 The estimated coefficient on 
DOCI is also positive, however, it is not significant at conventional levels. The other 
income measures (NDNI and NDOCI) show negative coefficients, but are non-significant. 
LSUR is significant (p<.01) and reports an estimated coefficient of 0.5725. Therefore, a 
one percent change in the earnings surprise is associated with a 57.25 percent increase in 
prior dispersion. Consistent with prior literature and my expectation, INST reports a 
negative and significant (p<.10) coefficient of -0.8056. Since the variable INST is the 
percent of shares outstanding held by institutions an increase of one percent in INST is 
associated with an 80.56 percent decrease in prior dispersion.  
 Hypothesis H2b posits that there is a positive relationship between derivative 
income measures and the change in dispersion (∆DSIP). Change in dispersion is the 
                                                 
21 For sufficiently small changes in DNI the interpretation shown here is generally acceptable. However, 
since LDISP is of lognormal form and DNI is reported in levels, the exact inference is computed as 100*[exp 
(.4622) – 1] = 58.76 percent. So, a one dollar change in per share DNI actually results in a 58.76 percent 
change in LDISP. 
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dispersion in the post-announcement period less dispersion in the pre-announcement 
period, standardized by the pre-announcement period mean forecast. Table 9 shows this 
model is significant at p<.05 and explains 11.53 percent of the variation in ∆DISP within 
firms. The coefficient on DNI is 0.0504 and is significant at the p<.05 level. Therefore, a 
one dollar per share increase in DNI is associated with a 0.0504 increase in dispersion. 
That is, increasing levels of DNI gives rise to expanding dispersion in analysts’ forecasts. 
DOCI has a positive estimated coefficient, however, it is non-significant. LSUR has an 
estimated coefficient of -0.0171 and is significant at the p<.05 level.  
 Hypothesis H3b posits that the correlation of the rank ordering of analysts’ 
forecasts before and after the announcement will be smaller as derivative income increases. 
JUMB is computed as the log of 1.1 minus the non-parametric correlation of the rank order 
of analysts’ forecasts before the announcement and after the announcement. Since the 
correlation of the rank order can be described as forecast order consistency, JUMB can be 
described as the log of the rank order inconsistency or the log of analysts’ reordering. As 
reported in Table 9, the model for JUMB is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 
35.16 percent of the variation in the dependent variable within firms. The estimated 
coefficient for DNI is positively associated with JUMB and is significant at the p<.05 
level. For sufficiently small changes in the independent variables, the interpretation of a 
coefficient is that 100 times the coefficient is equal to the percentage change in the 
reordering of analysts’ forecasts. A coefficient of 2.4778 means that one cent increase in  
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TABLE 9 
Relationship between Heterogeneity Measures and Derivative Income 
Hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and their respective p-values for the 
regression of each heterogeneity measure on the SFAS 133 income measures, 
controlling for earnings surprise, level of institutional holding, fair-value of hedging 
derivatives, year effects, and firm effects. 
 
LDISPit=β0+β1(DNIit)+β2(DOCIit)+β3(NDNIit)+β4(NDOCIit)+β5(LSURit)+ β6(INSTit)+β7(FVDit )+ 
β8(POST*FVDit)+ FEi  + εit 
 
∆DISPit=β0+β1(DNIit)+β2(DOCit)+β3(NDNIit)+β4(NDOCIit)+β5(LSURit)+ β6(INSTit)+β7(FVDit )+ 
β8(POST*FVDit)+ FEi  + εit 
 
JUMBit=β0+β1(DNIit)+β2(DOCit)+β3(NDNIit)+β4(NDOCIit)+β5(LSURit)+ β6(INSTit)+β7(FVDit )+ 
β8(POST*FVDit)+ FEi  + εit 
 
  LDISP ∆DISP JUMB 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Est. 
Coef. 
p-value 
Constant ? -1.1237 0.004*** -0.0661 0.270 0.1626 0.767 
DNI + 0.4622 0.097* 0.0504 0.014** 2.4778 0.017** 
DOCI + 0.1819 0.246 0.0029 0.813 0.0223 0.962 
NDNI ? -0.0529 0.425 0.0022 0.792 0.0111 0.930 
NDOCI ? -0.0112 0.909 -0.0042 0.728 0.6608 0.005*** 
LSUR + 0.5725 0.000*** -0.0171 0.016** -0.0435 0.578 
INST - -0.8056 0.090* 0.0593 0.352 -0.6984 0.314 
FVD + 0.0486 0.281 0.0004 0.910 0.6740 0.010*** 
FVD*POST + 0.0033 0.969 -0.0049 0.437 0.1781 0.166 
Year & Firm Effects Included Included Included 
    
N   223 223  92
Groups   51 51  37
Wald-sig   0.0000 0.0306  0.0000
Wald-stat   224.38 26.78  20.87
R2(within)   0.4552 0.1153  0.3516
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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per share DNI is associated with a 2.48 percent increase in the reordering of analysts’ 
forecasts.22  The coefficient of DOCI is positive as hypothesized, but is non-significant. 
The coefficient of NDOCI is significant at the p<.01 level and indicates that a one dollar 
per share increase in NDOCI results in a 66.08 percent increase in the degree of reordering 
among analysts. Finally, in this model the coefficient of FVD is also positive and 
significant at the p<.01 level. This indicates that a one percent increase in the fair-value of 
derivatives per share is associated with a 67.40 percent increase in the degree of analysts 
reordering. 
 The relationship between DNI and the three measures of heterogeneity is 
consistently positive and significant in all three models. DOCI has a positive coefficient in 
all models, but the relationship with the three dispersion measures in not significant at 
conventional levels. Hypotheses H1b, H2b, and H3b are supported only for the net income 
effect of SFAS 133. The interpretation for hypothesis H1b is that as the per share 
derivative net income increases, the degree of dispersion in analysts’ forecasts before the 
earnings announcement increases. This is consistent with analysts having greater difficulty 
predicting the net income associated with the SFAS 133 standard. Support for hypothesis 
H2b means that an increase in per share derivative net income is associated with an 
increase in analysts’ forecast dispersion from pre-announcement to post-announcement 
period. This indicates that the SFAS 133 earnings information is generating heterogeneity 
                                                 
22 The coefficient of 2.4778 is the estimated association between a lognormal dependent variable and a 
dependent variable measured in levels. For sufficiently small changes in the independent variable, the 
interpretation provided is generally accepted. However, the exact inference is computed as 100*[exp 
(.024778) – 1] = 2.51. A one cent change in per share DNI actually results in a 2.51 percent change in JUMB. 
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in analysts’ beliefs as opposed to increasing homogeneity in beliefs. Finally, as SFAS 133 
related net income per share increases, the degree of reordering among analysts (JUMB) 
also increases. This is consistent with information being differentially interpreted by 
analysts.  
Supplemental analysis: 
 Additionally, I carry out several other specification tests. First, I examine the 
relationships above with alternative specifications for the SFAS 133 income effects. I test 
derivative income expressed as a percent of total income and derivative income expressed 
as the aggregate sum of DNI and DOCI.23 Both of the alternative derivative income 
specifications are positive and significant at the p<.01 level for the model with LDISP as 
the dependent variable. The alternative derivative income measures are positive but 
insignificant for the models with ∆DISP and JUMB as the dependent variable. 
 I also test for interactions among the derivative income measures (DNI and DOCI) 
and control variables (LSUR, INST, FVD, and FVD*POST). None of the interaction 
effects are significant at conventional levels. Finally, I test for non-linear effects of the 
derivative income measures (DNI and DOCI). None were significant. 
 I replicate the analysis with alternative computations for LDISP and ∆DISP. I use 
the analysts’ forecast standard deviation and mean provided by I/B/E/S to recompute 
LDISP and ∆DISP. That is, I relax the restriction that only those analysts with forecasts 
both before and after the earnings announcement be used in computing these two measures 
                                                 
23 Derivative Percent = (DNI+DOCI) / (DNI+DOCI+NDNI+NDOCI) ; Derivative Total = (DNI+DOCI) 
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of heterogeneity. The results obtained from the alternative LDISP and ∆DISP measures are 
consistent with the results reported here. 
Results for Hypotheses H1c, H2c, and H3c 
 Hypothesis H1c, H2c, and H3c state that the portion of each of the three dispersion 
measures predicted by DNI and DOCI is positively related to abnormal trading volume. 
That is, I expect that the income effects of SFAS 133 influences abnormal volume through 
the three heterogeneity measures. The method applied requires that the portion the 
heterogeneity measures (LDISP, ∆DISP, JUMB) predicted by DNI and DOCI be used as 
regressors in a second model with abnormal volume as the dependent variable. I discuss 
the results of each of the three hypotheses individually, first by discussing the coefficient 
estimates and p-values associated with the normally obtained standard errors. After 
discussing each of these hypotheses in the context of the traditional estimation method, I 
then re-evaluate the significance of the estimated coefficients in light of p-values generated 
from standard errors obtained through a bootstrap procedure. Unlike the normally obtained 
standard errors, the bootstrap procedure accounts for the variability transferred from the 
first model to the second, providing a standard error appropriate for hypothesis testing. 
 Hypothesis H1c deals with the relationship between abnormal trading volume and 
the portion of LDISP predicted by DNI and DOCI. Table 10 shows the results of this 
examination. This model is significant at the p<.001 level and explains 17.70 percent of the 
variation in AV03TS. Consistent with my hypothesis, the portions of LDISP predicted by 
DNI (LDISP_DNI) and DOCI (LDISP_DOCI) both have positive estimated coefficients. 
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Only the portion predicted by DOCI is significant (p<.01). This means that a one percent 
change in the percent of dispersion predicted by DNI is associated with a 3.088 unit 
change in the AV03TS abnormal volume measure. The portion of LDISP not explained by 
derivative income measures (LDISP_OTH) shows a significant (p<.05) and negative 
coefficient of -0.3749. A unit change in the portion of dispersion not predicted by 
derivative income is associated with a 0.3749 unit decrease in AV03TS. Consistent with 
prior literature cumulative abnormal return (LCAR03) is significant (p<.01) with an 
estimated coefficient of 0.7285.  
 Since the LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI are generated regressors, the standard 
errors estimated in the regression do not take into account the fact that these regressors are 
estimates rather than measures. Estimation with a bootstrap approach is also performed to 
obtain standard errors appropriate for hypothesis testing. The estimated coefficients are not 
affected by this approach, but the standard errors are generally larger. The associated p-
values are listed adjacent to the standard p-values under the AV03TS model. Under the 
bootstrap method, only LDISP_OTH and LCAR03 retain significance in the model. 
 Panel A of Table 10 also reports the results of the model testing the relationship 
between the abnormal trading volume measure AV03FE and the portion of LDISP 
predicted by DNI and DOCI. This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 
21.80 percent of the variation in the abnormal volume measure. Consistent with my 
hypothesis, the portions of LDISP predicted by DNI (LDISP_DNI) and DOCI 
(LDISP_DOCI) both have positive estimated coefficients. Only the portion of LDISP 
predicted by DNI is significant (p<.10) in explaining variation in AV03FE. A one percent 
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change in the LDISP explained by DNI is positively related to a 1.46 percent change in 
abnormal volume. Control variables LSUR and LCAR03 are also significant and positive. 
As before, the significance indicated for the variables of interest in the initial regression is 
lost when the standard errors are estimated via bootstrap.  
 Finally, Panel A of Table 10 reports the results of the model testing the relationship 
between the abnormal trading volume measure AV03DF and the portion of LDISP 
predicted by DNI and DOCI. This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 
17.23 percent of the variation in the abnormal volume measure. Both LDISP_DNI and 
LDISP_DOCI have positive estimated coefficients. The coefficient on LDISP_DNI is 
estimated at 0.36 percent and is significant at the p<.10 two tailed level of significance. A 
one percent change in dispersion explained by DNI is associated with at 0.36 percent 
increase in AV03DF. The coefficient on LDISP_DOCI is estimated at 0.53 percent and is 
significant at the p<.05 two tailed level of significance. A one percent change in dispersion 
explained by DOCI is associated with at 0.53 percent increase in AV03DF. The estimated 
coefficient on LCAR03 is also significant (p<.01) and positive. In this model the 
significance on LDISP_DOCI retains significance at the p<.1 level even after estimating 
via the bootstrap method. It is important to note that the LDISP_DOCI variable is 
estimated from a regression (Eq.10, Table 9) in which DOCI was not significant at 
conventional levels in explaining variations in LDISP. Nonetheless, the coefficient 
estimated on DOCI in equation 10 was able to transfer a sufficient amount of information 
to the current model that it is significant in explaining variation in AV03DF. 
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 The tests on the relationship between abnormal trading volume and the portion of 
LDISP predicted by derivative income are also tested in the 7-day event window. These 
results are shown in Panel B of Table 10. These models are all significant at the p<.001 
level and explain between 10.30 percent and 16.86 percent of the variability in the 
abnormal volume measures. The variables of interest are all non-significant in these 
models.  
 Under the normally obtained standard errors and related p-values partial support is 
found for hypothesis H1c in all of the 3-day abnormal volume models. However, under the 
bootstrap procedure, support is only found for hypothesis H1c in the portion of LDISP 
predicted by DOCI in the AV03DF model. This indicates that while LDISP_DOCI and 
LDISP_DNI do transfer some information into the secondary model (equation 19), the 
precision of that information is limited. Of the three measures of abnormal volume, the 
difference-in-differences (AV03DF) measure is able to detect the information transferred 
in. The lack of significance in the model likely reflects that, while information was 
successfully transferred into the second model, it lacked sufficient precision to be detected 
in all but the AV03DF model. Application of a more precise mechanism for transferring 
the information from the primary model to the secondary model might yield significant 
results for the other measures of abnormal volume. The lack of any significance in the 7-
day window models indicates that any effect of the announcement with regard to SFAS 
133 is fully reflected in the 3-day window.  
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TABLE 10 
Panel A: Relationship Between Predicted Dispersion and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H1c) 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal 
volume measures on the levels of dispersion predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI). 
The results reported here are for the 3-day announcement window statistics. The table also reports the p-values associated 
with the bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings 
surprise, institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects.  
                                  ^                      ^                       ^ 
AVit=β0+β1(LDISP_DNIit)+β2(LDISP_DOCIit)+β3(LDISP_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR03it )+ FEi  + YEt  + εit 
 
 
PANEL A  AV03TS AV03FE AV03DF 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Constant ? 2.8736 0.166 0.143 0.0111 0.016** 0.010*** 0.0029 0.061* 0.071* 
LDISP_DNI& + 0.9588 0.720 0.835 0.0146 0.062* 0.234 0.0036 0.074* 0.224 
LDISP_DOCI& + 3.0880 0.005*** 0.315 0.0197 0.173 0.221 0.0053 0.049** 0.091* 
LDISP_OTH& ? -0.3749 0.051* 0.069* 0.0000 0.929 0.924 -0.0001 0.626 0.641 
LSUR + 0.2807 0.172 0.187 0.0008 0.080* 0.049** 0.0001 0.327 0.293 
INST - 0.6982 0.468 0.525 -0.0041 0.283 0.300 -0.0006 0.542 0.567 
LCAR03 + 0.7285 0.009*** 0.009*** 0.0012 0.025** 0.019** 0.0005 0.003*** 0.005***
Year & Firm Effects Included Included Included 
           
N  233 233 233
Groups  51 51 51
Wald-sig  0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0006 0.0000 0.0001
Wald-stat  80.22 49.80 38.43 35.75 72.30 42.20
R2(within)  0.1770 0.1770 0.2100 0.2100 0.1723 0.1723
# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of 
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.  
& LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI are the portions of LDISP predicted by the regression in Table 10 
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 10 (cont) 
Panel B: Relationship Between Predicted Dispersion and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H1c) 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal 
volume measures on the levels of dispersion predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI). 
The results reported here are for the 7-day announcement window statistics. The table also reports the p-values associated 
with the bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings 
surprise, institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects. 
                                  ^                      ^                       ^ 
AVit=β0+β1(LDISP_DNIit)+β2(LDISP_DOCIit)+β3(LDISP_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR07it )+ FEi  + YEt  + εit 
 
PANEL B  AV07TS AV07FE AV07DF 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Constant ? 2.4943 0.380 0.364 0.0179 0.003*** 0.002*** 0.0013 0.135 0.149 
LDISP_DNI& + -4.6189 0.259 0.515 0.0162 0.166 0.353 0.0007 0.551 0.703 
LDISP_DOCI& + 1.6677 0.627 0.816 0.0291 0.303 0.392 0.0029 0.205 0.225 
LDISP_OTH& ? -0.4453 0.135 0.222 0.0003 0.773 0.762 0.0000 0.704 0.715 
LSUR + 0.5300 0.078* 0.113 0.0012 0.072* 0.100* 0.0001 0.321 0.343 
INST - 1.9443 0.377 0.347 -0.0063 0.358 0.287 -0.0005 0.513 0.493 
LCAR07 + 0.6183 0.115 0.095* 0.0018 0.015** 0.008*** 0.0002 0.027** 0.027** 
Year & Firm Effects Included Included Included 
           
N  233  233  223  
Groups  51  51  51  
Wald-sig  0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0001 0.0000 0.0004
Wald-stat  58.09 41.80 52.12 40.27 53.34 37.43
R2(within)  0.1686 0.1686 0.1530 0.1530 0.1030 0.1030
# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of 
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.  
& LDISP_DNI and LDISP_DOCI are the portions of LDISP predicted by the regression in Table 10.  
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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 Hypothesis H2c deals with the relationship between abnormal trading volume and 
the portion of ∆DISP predicted by DNI and DOCI. Table 11 shows the results of this 
examination. This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 20.00 percent of the 
variation in AV03TS. Consistent with my hypothesis, the portions of ∆DISP predicted by 
DNI (∆DISP_DNI) and DOCI (∆DISP_DOCI) both have positive estimated coefficients. 
Only the portion predicted by DOCI (∆DISP_DOCI) is significant (p<.05). This means 
that a one percent increase in the portion of ∆DSIP predicted by DNI is associated with a 
193.2947 unit change in the AV03TS abnormal volume measure. The extreme coefficient 
is the result of a very small coefficient on the base regression (equation 11, Table 9) and 
the dependent variable in this model being a lognormal value.  The portion of ∆DISP not 
explained by derivative income (∆DISP_OTH) shows a positive and significant (p<.05) 
coefficient. This means that a unit increase in the change in dispersion not related to 
derivative income is associated with a 4.0909 unit increase in AV03TS. LCAR03 is also 
significant (p<.05) with an estimated coefficient of 0.6575. A one percent increase in the 3-
day cumulative abnormal return is associated with a 0.6575 unit increase in AV03TS. Only 
the significance of LCAR03 is retained through the bootstrap estimation. 
 The same regression model is estimated with AV03FE as the measure of abnormal 
volume. This model is significant at the p<.01 level and explains 21.80 percent of the 
variation in the dependent variable. As predicted both ∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI 
have positive estimated coefficients. However, only ∆DISP_DNI is significant (p<.1) with 
an estimated coefficient of 0.1339. This means that a one percent increase in the amount of 
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∆DISP explained by DNI is associated with an increase in abnormal volume equal to 13.39 
percent of shares outstanding. As with the previous model, the magnitude of this 
coefficient is the result of the small coefficient in regression (equation 11, Table 9). 
Coefficient estimates for LSUR and LCAR03 are both positive and significant at 
conventional levels. None of the 7-day window abnormal volume measures show 
significance. 
 None of the variables of interest retain significance through the bootstrapping 
method. Under the normally obtained standard errors and p-values, hypothesis H2c would 
find support in all three of the 3-day window models. None are significant under the 
bootstrap method. Therefore, hypothesis H2c is not supported. There is insufficient 
evidence to conclude that the portion ∆DISP predicted by SFAS 133 income effects has 
explanatory power for abnormal volume. The lack of significance in the model likely 
reflects that, while information was successfully transferred into the second model, it 
lacked sufficient precision to be detected. Use of a more precise mechanism for 
transferring the information from the primary model to the secondary model might provide 
significant results.  
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TABLE 11 
Panel A: Relationship Between Predicted Change in Dispersion and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H2c) 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal volume 
measures on the levels of change in dispersion predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI). 
The results reported here are for the 3-day announcement window. The table also reports the p-values associated with the 
bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings surprise, 
institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects. 
                                  ^                      ^                       ^ 
AVit=β0+β1(∆DISP_DNIit)+β2(∆DISP_DOCIit)+β3(∆DISP_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR03it )+ FEi  + YEt  + εit 
 
PANEL A  AV03TS AV03FE AV03DF 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Constant ? 3.2978 0.119 0.104 0.0114 0.015** 0.013** 0.0030 0.056* 0.055* 
∆DISP_DNI& + 11.6406 0.647 0.807 0.1339 0.082* 0.243 0.0328 0.076* 0.264 
∆DISP_DOCI& + 193.2947 0.011** 0.289 1.1727 0.162 0.212 0.3264 0.050* 0.103 
∆DISP_OTH& ? 4.0909 0.049** 0.172 0.0071 0.072* 0.220 0.0023 0.009*** 0.048** 
LSUR + 0.1501 0.298 0.345 0.0009 0.007*** 0.013** 0.0001 0.141 0.175 
INST - 0.9824 0.315 0.399 -0.0048 0.208 0.198 -0.0007 0.471 0.526 
LCAR03 + 0.6575 0.017** 0.013** 0.0011 0.033 0.050** 0.0005 0.004*** 0.006*** 
Year & Firm Effects Included Included Included 
           
N  223  223  223  
Groups  51  51  51  
Wald-sig  0.0000 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000
Wald-stat  67.07 43.54 40.34 37.54 53.44 43.08
R2(within)  0.2000 0.2000 0.2180 0.2180 0.1779 0.1779
# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of 
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.  
& ∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI are the portions of ∆DISP predicted by the regression in Table 10.  
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 11 (cont) 
Panel B: Relationship Between Predicted Change in Dispersion and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H2c) 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal volume 
measures on the levels of change in dispersion predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI). 
The results reported here are for the 7-day announcement window. The table also reports the p-values associated with the 
bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings surprise, 
institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects. 
                                  ^                      ^                       ^ 
AVit=β0+β1(∆DISP_DNIit)+β2(∆DISP_DOCIit)+β3(∆DISP_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR07it )+ FEi  + YEt  + εit 
 
PANEL B  AV07TS AV07FE AV07DF 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. Coef. p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Constant ? 3.3834 0.229 0.230 0.0180 0.002*** 0.002*** 0.0014 0.101 0.093* 
∆DISP_DNI& + -36.8480 0.336 0.616 0.1461 0.164 0.339 0.0065 0.515 0.688 
∆DISP_DOCI& + 100.1900 0.638 0.797 1.7956 0.308 0.356 0.1785 0.206 0.253 
∆DISP_OTH& ? 8.2189 0.003*** 0.022** 0.0107 0.168 0.245 0.0020 0.001*** 0.021** 
LSUR + 0.4646 0.065* 0.072* 0.0015 0.003*** 0.013** 0.0001 0.102 0.170 
INST - 2.3313 0.287 0.284 -0.0075 0.270 0.258 -0.0005 0.472 0.469 
LCAR07 + 0.5671 0.147 0.154 0.0018 0.012** 0.011** 0.0002 0.030** 0.061** 
Year & Firm Effects Included Included Included 
           
N  223  223  223  
Groups  51  51  51  
Wald-sig  0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0000 0.0004
Wald-stat  57.96 42.70 54.10 42.72 45.46 36.93
R2(within)  0.1686 0.1686 0.1562 0.1562 0.1080 0.1080
# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of 
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.  
& ∆DISP_DNI and ∆DISP_DOCI are the portions of ∆DISP predicted by the regression in Table 10.  
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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 Hypothesis H3c deals with the relationship between abnormal trading volume and 
the portion of JUMB predicted by DNI and DOCI. Table 12 shows the results of this 
examination. In Panel A the results for the models using the 3-day abnormal volume 
measures are reported. The first model, using AV03TS as the abnormal volume measure is 
significant at the p<.001 level and explains 32.66 percent of the variation in AV03TS. 
However, this model fails to show significance for the variables of interest.  
 Also shown in Panel A of Table 12 are the results for the model using AV03FE as 
the dependent variable. This model is significant and the p<.01 level and explains 
approximately 22.8 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. In this model, the 
estimated coefficients on the variables of interest are positive and significant.  The 
estimated coefficient on the portion of JUMB related to DNI (JUMB_DNI) is 0.41 percent 
and is significant at the p<.05 level. A percentage increase in the degree of analysts’ 
reordering related to DNI is associated with an increase in the abnormal trading volume 
equal to 0.41 percent of shares outstanding. The estimated coefficient on the portion of 
JUMB related to DOCI (JUMB_DOCI) is 0.3616 percent and is significant at the p<.05 
level. A percentage increase in the degree of analysts’ reordering related to DOCI is 
associated with an increase in the abnormal trading volume equal to 36.16 percent of 
shares outstanding. LCAR03 is also significant (p<.05) with an estimated coefficient of 
0.30 percent. The JUMB_DOCI variable survives the bootstrap procedure and remains 
significant at the p<.1 level.  
 Panel A of Table 12 also shows the results for the model using AV03DF as the 
dependent variable. This model is significant and the p<.01 level and explains 
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approximately 21.74 percent of the variation in the dependent variable. In this model, the 
estimated coefficients on the variables of interest are positive and significant.  The 
estimated coefficient on the portion of JUMB related to DNI (JUMB_DNI) is 0.10 percent 
and is significant at the p<.01 level. A percentage increase in the degree of analysts’ 
reordering related to DNI is associated with an increase in the abnormal trading volume 
equal to 0.10 percent of shares outstanding. The estimated coefficient on the portion of 
JUMB related to DOCI (JUMB_DOCI) is 5.51 percent and is significant at the p<.01 level. 
A percentage increase in the degree of analysts’ reordering related to DOCI is associated 
with an increase in the abnormal trading volume equal to 5.51 percent of shares 
outstanding. LCAR03 is also significant (p<.01) with an estimated coefficient of 0.11 
percent. A one percent increase in the cumulative abnormal 3-day return is associated with 
a 0.11 percent increase in AV03DF. The JUMB_DNI variable survives the bootstrap 
procedure and remains significant at the p<.1 level.  
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TABLE 12 
Panel A: Relationship Between Predicted Jumbling and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H3c) 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal 
volume measures on the levels of jumbling predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (JUMB_DNI and JUMB_DOCI). 
The results reported here are for the 3-day announcement window. The table also reports the p-values associated with the 
bootstrap method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings surprise, 
institutional holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects. 
                                  ^                      ^                       ^ 
AVit=β0+β1(JUMB_DNIit)+β2(JUMB_DOCIit)+β3(JUMB_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR03it )+ FEi  + YEt  + εit 
 
PANEL A  AV03TS AV03FE AV03DF 
Variable Exp. 
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Constant ? 8.2701 0.065* 0.004*** 0.0235 0.035** 0.036** 0.0071 0.058* 0.047** 
JUMB_DNI& + 0.4762 0.347 0.604 0.0041 0.013** 0.107 0.0010 0.007*** 0.058** 
JUMB_DOCI& + 1.7998 0.379 0.751 0.3161 0.027** 0.083* 0.0551 0.004*** 0.181 
JUMB_OTH& ? 0.6257 0.076* 0.066** 0.0008 0.355 0.441 0.0004 0.097 0.135 
LSUR + -0.2343 0.354 0.427 -0.0003 0.529 0.623 -0.0002 0.096 0.193 
INST - -0.8534 0.638 0.671 -0.0110 0.159 0.143 -0.0019 0.257 0.299 
LCAR03 + 1.4535 0.005*** 0.013** 0.0030 0.025** 0.044** 0.0011 0.004*** 0.009*** 
Year & Firm Effects Included Included Included 
           
N  92  92  92  
Groups  37  37  37  
Wald-sig  0.0000 0.0062 0.0048 0.0265 0.0000 0.0045
Wald-stat  52.12 29.19 29.96 15.71 100.46 30.13
R2(within)  .3266 0.3266 0.2282 0.2282 0.2174 0.2174
# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of 
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.  
& JUMB_DNI and JUMB_DOCI are the portions of JUMB predicted by the regression in Table 10.  
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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TABLE 12 (cont) 
Panel B: Relationship Between Predicted Jumbling and Abnormal Trading Volume (Hypothesis H3c) 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates and associated p-values from the regression of each of the three abnormal volume 
measures on the levels of jumbling predicted by the SFAS 133 income effects (JUMB_DNI and JUMB_DOCI). The results 
reported here are for the 7-day announcement window. The table also reports the p-values associated with the bootstrap 
method for estimating standard errors for generated regressors. Controls are included for earnings surprise, institutional 
holding, abnormal returns, and year and firm effects. 
                                  ^                      ^                       ^ 
AVit=β0+β1(JUMB_DNIit)+β2(JUMB_DOCIit)+β3(JUMB_OTHit)+β4(LSURit)+ β5(INSTit)+β6(LCAR07it )+ FEi  + YEt  + εit 
 
PANEL B  AV07TS AV07FE AV07DF 
Variable Exp.
Sign 
Est. 
Coef.  
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value#
Est. 
Coef. 
p-value Boot.  
p-value# 
Constant ? 8.4984 0.153 0.204 0.0297 0.003*** 0.009*** 0.0030 0.065* 0.051** 
JUMB_DNI& + 0.2952 0.796 0.899 0.0046 0.180 0.364 0.0002 0.514 0.596 
JUMB_DOCI& + -3.1403 0.947 0.984 0.0588 0.075* 0.069* 0.0299 0.071* 0.186 
JUMB_OTH& ? 1.1589 0.164 0.184 0.0005 0.732 0.793 0.0002 0.239 0.274 
LSUR + -0.0966 0.842 0.858 -0.0004 0.670 0.736 -0.0002 0.126 0.208 
INST - 1.2162 0.766 0.798 -0.0178 0.189 0.199 -0.0008 0.580 0.595 
LCAR07 + 1.2248 0.040* 0.134 0.0031 0.018** 0.097* 0.0005 0.001*** 0.013** 
Year & Firm Effects Included Included Included 
           
N  92  92  92  
Groups  37  37  37  
Wald-sig  0.0024 0.0135 0.0019 0.0796 0.0000 0.0065
Wald-stat  32.00 26.75 32.70 20.68 59.96 29.01
R2(within)  0.2027 0.2027 0.2936 0.2163 0.1988 0.1988
# Standard errors estimated via the bootstrap method are typically larger than the normally obtained standard errors. As a result, findings of 
significance under the normally obtained standard errors may not be significant under the bootstrap estimation procedure.  
& JUMB_DNI and JUMB_DOCI are the portions of JUMB predicted by the regression in Table 10.  
*, **, *** indicate two tail significance at .10, .05, and .01 levels, respectively. 
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 All of the 7-day window models are significant overall; however, only one model 
indicates significance on the variables of interest. The model using AV07FE as the 
dependent shows a positive and significant (p<.1) coefficient on JUMB_DOCI. A 
percentage increase in the degree of analysts’ reordering related to DOCI is associated with 
an increase in the abnormal trading volume equal to 5.88 percent of shares outstanding. 
This effect retains significance (p<.1) through the bootstrap procedure. The loss of 
significance relative to the other abnormal volume measures likely reflects that, while 
information was successfully transferred into the second model, it lacked sufficient 
precision to be detected. An improved mechanism for transferring the information from the 
primary model to the secondary model may yield significant results. 
   Both hypothesis H1c and H3c find support in the original estimation method and 
maintain, albeit weaker, support after the appropriate standard errors are estimated. 
Hypothesis H2c fails to find support through the bootstrap estimation. In all cases, the 
fixed-effect and difference-in-differences abnormal volume measures are more powerful in 
detecting the effect than the abnormal volume from the time-series estimation method.  
There is evidence to support the assertion that the income effects of SFAS 133 have 
explanatory power for abnormal volume by way of the LDISP and JUMB heterogeneity 
measures. Both prior dispersion heterogeneity (LDISP) and the differential interpretation 
heterogeneity (JUMB) are positively associated with SFAS 133 income measures.  The 
portion of the two measures predicted by the SFAS 133 measures are also significantly 
related to observed abnormal trading volume. 
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Supplemental analysis: 
 For each of the models expressed in equations 19, 20, and 21, I test for interactions 
effects between the variables of interest and the control variables (LSUR, INST, LCAR03, 
and LCAR07). None of the interactions is significant in explaining variability in abnormal 
volume. 
 Finally, I also test H1c, H2c, and H3c using the alternative computations for LDISP 
and ∆DISP described earlier. I use the analysts’ forecast standard deviation and mean 
provided by I/B/E/S to recomputed LDISP and ∆DISP. The results obtained from the 
alternative LDISP and ∆DISP measures are consistent with the results reported here. 
 
  91
V Conclusions 
  
Using a sample of 51 banking organizations, I examine four measures of belief 
heterogeneity surrounding earnings announcements by firms utilizing derivatives for 
hedging purposes. Due to the underlying complexity of both derivatives and the accounting 
treatment prescribed by the SFAS 133 standard, I expect that investors may have differing 
interpretations of the newly provided information. Generally, I hypothesize that the income 
effects arising from the fair-value accounting for derivatives (SFAS 133) are associated 
with an increase in differing beliefs among individuals. 
I find that the income effects of SFAS 133 are significantly related to belief 
heterogeneity among investors. The net income and other comprehensive income effects of 
SFAS 133 are significantly related to increasing levels of abnormal trading volume 
surrounding earnings announcements. Additionally, the level of SFAS 133 net income is 
significantly and positively associated with three measures of belief heterogeneity derived 
from analysts’ forecasts. In an extended analysis I model the SFAS 133 income effects on 
abnormal volume using the three belief heterogeneity measures as the conduit. I find 
support for two of the three heterogeneity measures acting as a conduit for the effect of the 
income measures on abnormal volume. This result was only found on the fixed-effect and 
difference-in-differences estimates of abnormal volume.  
 Also in an examination of banking organizations, Ahmed et al., (2006) show that 
the fair-value recognition of derivatives is value relevant. Further, they demonstrate that 
changes in the levels of fair-value recognition are relevant to equity returns. Their findings 
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show that the recognition of derivatives at fair value is meaningful in establishing the 
market equilibrium price. The results of this study, taken together with Ahmed et al., 
(2006), indicate that the SFAS 133 compliant financial information generates 
heterogeneity of beliefs while at the same time providing value relevant information. 
While the reporting of recognized derivatives is value relevant in establishing the 
aggregate belief in the market, the income effects of the same standard cause the aggregate 
belief to be based on a weaker consensus. 
 Practitioners should find these results relevant when evaluating the effect of fair-
value recognition on market participants. To the extent that differential beliefs and 
differential interpretations surrounding the reported fair-value information expand and 
persist over time, standard setters may need to reconcile this market reaction with the 
underlying purpose of adopting fair-value accounting standards. Accounting researchers 
may find the results informative for applying a more appropriate standard error estimation 
technique when generated regressors are employed. 
 I make several contributions to the literature. First, I employ abnormal trading 
volume as a tool to examine the effect of derivative fair-value accounting on belief 
heterogeneity in the market. Second, I relate abnormal volume and three measures of belief 
heterogeneity to the income effects of SFAS 133. Third, I model the relationship between 
the portions of the three measures of belief heterogeneity attributable to SFAS 133 income 
and observed abnormal volume. Fourth, I demonstrate the necessity of applying an 
alternative standard error estimation procedure when hypotheses are tested in a model with 
generated regressors. 
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Limitations: 
 The results of this study may not be broadly generalizable. First, the sample in this 
study is restricted to regulated, banking organizations. Second, the study is based on a 
limited sample of 223 firm-years observations representing 51 firms. 
 As with most archival market studies, several threats to validity are present. Several 
external events occurred proximal to the initial announcement dates of SFAS 133 
compliant results. Specifically, the effects of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack cannot 
be fully assessed nor captured in a model. While the first earnings announcements for 
financial results compliant with SFAS 133 were not issued until mid January 2002, the 
lingering effect of the turmoil and passage of the Patriot Act cannot be dismissed. Second, 
Regulation FD was adopted by the SEC on August 15, 2000. This regulation required that 
any disclosure made to any group of users (in particular following analysts) must be made 
readily available to all users in a public forum or media. In response, firms may have made 
more information available to a broader base of investor. Third, in June 2000, FASB issued 
SFAS 138. As a result, the effect of SFAS 138 is temporally linked to the valuation and 
income effects of SFAS 133.  
Opportunities for Future Research: 
 One further exploration dealing with the volume and price reactions around SFAS 
133 compliant earnings announcements is in the identification and measurement of 
announcement specific characteristics.  These announcement specific characteristics may 
influence the relationships explored here. Components of net income and other 
comprehensive income can be expected to influence the strength of the heterogeneity 
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relationship to income measures. The smoothness (or volatility) of earnings along with 
levels of disclosure in general may also be an important factors.  In this study, I examine 
the total income and other comprehensive income effect of all derivatives. Future research 
into the specific types of derivative hedging activity (i.e. cash flow, fair value, and foreign 
exchange) should be explored. As each of these derivatives strategies have different uses 
and implications for the firms’ financial position and future cash flows, differing levels of 
each may have an effect on heterogeneity. 
 Alternative measures of information asymmetry should also be examined. For 
example, bid-ask and credit yields have been identified in the literature as market measures 
reflecting differing views about risk and uncertainty. Utilization of these alternative 
measures provides two significant benefits. First, a significant portion of the 276 firm-year 
observations lost due to insufficient analysts’ following could be recovered into the 
sample. Second, these alternative measures could be used to test the robustness of the 
results reported here. 
 Examination of the level of observed heterogeneity over time should also be 
explored. Specifically, the question as to whether the market participants learn over time 
how to build the effects of the new standard into expectations, and if that is observed as a 
reduction in observed heterogeneity. 
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APPENDIX A 
Variable Definitions – Income Measures and Abnormal Trading Volume 
    
Variable Title Units/Form Definition/Computation 
    
Income Measures   
DNI Derivative Net Income Dollars per share Per share before tax net income arising from SFAS-133 
    
DOCI Derivative OCI Dollars per share Per share other comprehensive income (gross of tax effect) 
arising from SFAS-133 
    
NDNI Non-Derivative Net 
Income 
Dollars per share Per share before tax net income excluding effect of SFAS-133 
    
NDOCI Non-Derivative OCI Dollars per share Per share other comprehensive income (gross of tax effect) 
excluding effect of SFAS-133 
Abnormal Trading Volume Measures 
AV03TS / 
(AV07TS) 
Time Series estimation of 
abnormal trading volume 
for 3-day (7-day) 
window 
No units specified Difference between the log of actual trading volume during the 
announcement period and the log of estimated normal trading 
volume during the announcement period (3 and 7 day). The 
difference is divided by the standard deviation of the residuals 
from the time-series regression. Normal trading volume is 
estimated with a first order autoregressive model where the log 
of the percent of firm shares traded is the dependent variable, 
and is regressed on the contemporaneous percent of market 
shares traded. The non-announcement period used in the 
estimation begins 50 days prior to announcement date and 
ends 10 days prior to the announcement date.  
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APPENDIX A (cont) 
Variable Definitions – Abnormal Trading Volume  
    
Variable Title Units/Form Definition/Computation 
    
Abnormal Trading Volume Measures –cont. 
AV03FE /  
(AV07FE) 
Firm effect estimation of 
abnormal trading volume 
for 3-day (7day) window 
% of shares Difference between actual trading volume during the 
announcement period and estimated normal trading volume 
during the announcement period (3 and 7 day). Normal trading 
volume is estimated with cross-sectional panel data using both 
firm effects and year effects. The parameters are estimated 
over the non-announcement period beginning 50 trading days 
prior to announcement and ending 10 days prior to 
announcement. The estimated parameters are then used to 
estimate normal volume through the announcement period.  
    
AV03DF / 
(AV07DF) 
Difference in Differences 
estimation of abnormal 
trading volume for 3-day 
(7-day) window 
% of shares Difference between firm excess trading volume and market 
excess trading volume during the announcement period (3 and 
7 day windows). Firm excess trading volume is computed as 
the percent of shares traded over the announcement period less 
the percent of shares traded over the non-announcement 
period. Market excess trading volume is computed in the same 
way with the same announcement and non-announcement 
periods. The announcement period begins 50 trading days 
prior to announcement and ends 10 days prior to 
announcement. 
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APPENDIX A (cont) 
Variable Definitions – Heterogeneity Measures  
    
Variable Title Units/Form Definition/Computation 
    
Heterogeneity Measures 
LDISP Prior Dispersion  Natural log of the standard deviation of analysts forecasts 
issued within 30 days prior to the earnings announcement 
divided by the mean forecast 
    
∆DISP Change in Dispersion  Standard deviation of analysts forecasts issued within 45 days 
of earnings announcement less standard deviation of analysts 
forecasts issued within 30 days prior to earnings 
announcement divided by the pre-announcement mean forecast
    
JUMB Jumbling  Natural log of 1.1 minus the non-parametric correlation 
coefficient of the rank order of analysts forecasts prior to 
earnings announcement and post earnings announcement  
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APPENDIX A (cont) 
Variable Definitions – Control Variables  
    
Variable Title Units/Form Definition/Computation 
    
Control Variables 
LSUR Earnings surprise ln(per share) Natural log of the absolute value of the difference between the 
mean analyst forecast and actual EPS, divided by the mean 
analysts forecast 
    
INST Institutional Holdings % of shares Shares held by institutions at end of reporting period divided 
by shares outstanding at end of reporting period. 
FVD Fair Value of Hedge 
Derivatives 
per share Gross amount of fair value of derivatives per share. 
    
LCAR03 /  
(LCAR07) 
3-day (7-day) window 
abnormal returns 
ln(CAR) CAR is computed by estimating the normal return against 
market return for the period beginning 50 days prior to 
announcement and ending 10 days prior to announcement. The 
estimated parameters from that regression are used to forecast 
normal returns through the announcement period. The 
difference between actual daily return and predicted normal 
return are summed over the 3-day (7-day) announcement 
period. 
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